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ABSTRACT—Professor Redish has anchored the modern class action in 
American political and constitutional theory, raising serious questions 
about the legitimacy of this procedural device for resolving aggregate 
claims. Professor Redish’s major insight is his argument that the courts and 
litigants have transformed the modern class action from a mere procedural 
device into a means for controlling and altering substantive law in ways 
that he considers to be highly undemocratic.  
Others, however, have suggested that the class action is dead. The 
Article surveys accounts of the death of class actions and explains the 
continued endurance of class litigation, which, it turns out, is hard to kill 
off. The Article then documents the changing landscape of aggregate 
dispute resolution, documenting a significant paradigm shift in the twenty-
first century towards increased use of private claims resolution 
mechanisms. The Article focuses on settlement classes, multidistrict 
litigation procedure, contractual nonclass settlements, the quasi-class 
action, and fund approaches to mass claim resolution. 
Finally, the Article critically evaluates this paradigm shift and 
concludes that Redish’s critique of class action litigation has even greater 
relevance in the new world of nonclass, aggregate claims resolution: that 
Professor Redish’s critique applies with even greater force in the nonclass 
universe. With the paradigm shift towards nonclass aggregate claims 
resolution, the arc of history may be bending towards greater injustice—a 
shift that is more significant because it is largely unbounded by rules and 
unmoored from judicial oversight. 
 
AUTHOR—Morris & Rita Atlas Chair in Advocacy, the University of 
Texas School of Law. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
512 
 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 512 
I. THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THE CLASS ACTION: THE DEATH OF  CLASS ACTIONS (I) . 517 
A. The Life Cycle of the Class Action (Death #1) ............................................. 517 
B. Class Actions Revivified, 1966 ..................................................................... 518 
C. The Death of the Class Action, 1970s (Death #2) ........................................ 519 
D. Class Actions Reinvigorated—Mass Tort Litigation, 1980s ........................ 521 
E. Are Class Actions Dead? (Deaths #3, 4, 5, and 6) ....................................... 523 
F. Countersigns of Life: Class Actions Resuscitated (Again) ........................... 531 
II. FROM RULE 23 AND CLASS ACTIONS TO AGGREGATE LITIGATION: THE DEATH  
OF CLASS ACTIONS (II) ......................................................................................... 536 
A. The Triumph of MDL Procedure and Settlement Classes ............................ 537 
B. The Contractual Nonclass Aggregate Settlement Movement ....................... 539 
C. The Invention of the Quasi-Class Action ..................................................... 541 
D. Fund Approaches to Aggregate Claims Resolution ..................................... 549 
III. THE END OF DEMOCRATIC PROCESS: THE DEATH OF  CLASS ACTIONS (III) ........... 551 
A. Aggregate Litigation Claims Resolution in a Nonclass Universe—
Documenting the Paradigm Shift ................................................................. 551 
B. The End of Structural Assurances of Due Process ...................................... 554 
C. Aggregate Litigation Claims Resolution as a Matter of Private 
Arrangements: The Death of Democratic Dispute Resolution ..................... 556 
CONCLUSION: IS THE ARC OF HISTORY BENDING TOWARDS  GREATER INJUSTICE? ........ 563 
 
Class actions are dead. 
   —Kenneth R. Feinberg† 
INTRODUCTION 
No one has written as passionately and well about the democratic 
theory of class action litigation than Professor Martin H. Redish.1 Indeed, 
no one else has written about it at all.2 Through a series of landmark 
 
†  Kenneth R. Feinberg, Unconventional Responses to Unique Catastrophes: Tailoring the Law to 
Meet the Challenges, Address Before the Faculty of the University of Texas School of Law (Oct. 3, 
2011). 
1 See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE 
PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT (2009). 
2 See id. (back cover) (“Although much has been written about class actions, this book is original 
and enormously important. No one else has analyzed the class action from the perspective of political 
and democratic theory. All who write about class actions, whatever their perspective, will need to 
consider and address this provocative work. It is a superb contribution to the literature.” (quoting Erwin 
Chemerinsky)); id. (back cover) (“Widely regarded as one of the most important federal courts scholars 
of the past quarter century, Redish is also a leading figure in constitutional law. In this convincing, 
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articles,3 Professor Redish has anchored the modern class action in 
American political and constitutional theory and, at the same time, raised 
serious questions about the legitimacy of this procedural device. 
Professor Redish’s major insight into class action litigation is his 
argument that the courts and litigants have transformed the modern class 
action from a mere procedural device into a means for controlling and 
altering substantive law in ways that he considers to be highly 
undemocratic.4 In particular, Redish has identified and challenged the drift 
of the modern class action into what he has labeled the “bounty hunter” 
remedial model,5 characterizing such litigation as “faux” class actions.6 
In addition to taking aim at the problem of faux class actions, Redish 
rightly has focused much of his critique on the modern settlement class 
action, a mechanism greatly expanded in the late 1990s that generated 
enormous controversy in the courts and academic arena.7 Redish has 
argued that settlement classes, “where all sides are in total agreement from 
 
dramatic work, he has fused his fields of expertise in a unique effort to address the class action in terms 
of democratic theory. He makes a startlingly strong case that class practice undermines significant 
notions of democratic accountability and raises serious questions about underlying democratic values.” 
(quoting Richard D. Freer)). 
3 See Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection of 
Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71; Martin H. Redish, Procedural Due 
Process and Aggregation Devices in Mass Tort Litigation, 63 DEF. COUNS. J. 18 (1996); Martin H. 
Redish, The Need for Jurisdictional and Structural Class Action Reform, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,984 
(2002); Martin H. Redish & Clifford W. Berlow, The Class Action as Political Theory, 85 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 753 (2007); Martin H. Redish & Andrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement Class Actions, the Case-or-
Controversy Requirement, and the Nature of the Adjudicatory Process, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 545 (2006); 
Martin H. Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class Actions, Litigant Autonomy, and the Foundations of 
Procedural Due Process, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1573 (2007). 
4 If true, of course, this violates the stricture of the Rules Enabling Act, which prohibits rules of 
procedure that amend, abridge, or modify substantive rights. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006). 
5 See REDISH, supra note 1, at 14 (“Instead of compensating victims as dictated by controlling 
substantive law, the class proceeding effectively imposes an entirely different—and often far more 
politically controversial—remedial structure, what can best be labeled a ‘bounty hunter’ remedial 
model. Here private class action plaintiffs’ attorneys—individuals who themselves are not victims 
seeking to be made whole—sue as a type of legal vigilante to enforce substantive behavioral 
proscriptions against wrongdoers. In such situations the class exists, as a practical matter, solely for the 
purposes of display. . . . The so-called class itself is all but comatose.”). 
6 Id. at 14–15 (“Under the guise of a procedural rule, these ‘faux’ class actions have the 
inescapable, albeit indirect, impact of transforming substantive law containing a private compensatory 
remedy into a law that contains a bounty hunter enforcement mechanism. This is a potentially 
controversial result politically that has presumably never even been considered, much less formally 
adopted, by the lawmaking organ that promulgated the applicable substantive law in the first place.”). 
7 See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 865 (1999) (reversing approval of asbestos 
settlement class); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 629 (1997) (approving decertification 
of a similar asbestos settlement class); see also Symposium, Mass Tortes: Serving Up Just Desserts, 
80 CORNELL L. REV. 811 (1995) (presenting submissions discussing the tensions between individual 
autonomy and collective justice, especially regarding settlement class actions). 
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the very initiation of the proceeding,” raise serious questions about the 
constitutionality of the entire process.8 
Specifically, Professor Redish contends that settlement classes violate 
the Article III requirement that federal courts adjudicate only “real cases 
and controversies,” and that ginned-up disputes that are resolved through 
settlement classes violate Article III of the Constitution.9 In addition, 
Redish has persuasively argued that settlement classes are the poster child 
for procedural mechanisms that transgress the Rules Enabling Act,10 and 
therefore that settlement classes under Rule 23 are an unconstitutional 
exercise of judicial authority.11 
As a consequence of his critique of the class action mechanism, 
Professor Redish suggests that “major constitutionally dictated changes” to 
Rule 23 and prevailing judicial applications of Rule 23 doctrine are 
necessary.12 In this view, federal courts should hold that settlement classes 
contravene the Article III case or controversy requirement because current 
doctrine sanctions the judicial resolution of faux disputes, without any real 
case or controversy. In addition, courts should find that all mandatory 
classes, with the possible exception of Rule 23(b)(1)(A) classes,13 violate 
the Due Process Clause because they do not permit voluntary exclusion 
from the binding nature of the class judgment.14 
Finally, Professor Redish suggests that the existing Rule 23(b)(3) opt-
out procedure also violates the Due Process Clause by departing from key 
notions of democratic theory.15 Among his recommendations for possible 
 
8 REDISH, supra note 1, at 19 (“But when federal courts, bound by the Constitution to operate only 
through the adjudication of active, adversary cases or controversies, issue binding legal decrees in 
proceedings where all sides are in total agreement from the very initiation of the proceeding, serious 
questions may be raised about the constitutionality of the entire process. The settlement class action 
undermines both the formalistic dictates of Article III and the important constitutional values 
underlying the requirement of adversary adjudication.”). 
9 See, e.g., id. at 176‒83. 
10 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006) (indicating that rules of procedure may not enlarge, abridge, or 
modify substantive rights of litigants). 
11 See, e.g., REDISH, supra note 1, at 72‒85. 
12 See id. at 231. 
13 Rule 23(b)(1)(A) describes the “prejudice to defendants” class. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A). This 
mechanism is largely used to certify classes where in the absence of a class action, prejudice would 
likely result to the defendant who might be subjected to multiple, conflicting individual judgments and 
who would not, as a consequence, know how to obey the law. The theory is that by joining all plaintiffs 
against the defendant, a unitary judgment will result. Prevailing doctrine suggests that Rule 23(b)(1)(A) 
class actions are not suitable for the recovery of monetary damages but are suitable for injunctive and 
similar relief. 
14 See REDISH, supra note 1, at 231. 
15 Cf. id. at 131‒33 (describing the very limited circumstances in which an opt-out, as opposed to 
an opt-in, procedure is acceptable). As he develops this consent thesis throughout the book, Professor 
Redish argues that the only democratic theory by which class members can reasonably manifest consent 
to be bound by a class judgment is by an affirmative act to opt into the class and not through the 
negative mechanism of opting out and thereby withdrawing consent. Id. at 169‒73. As current class 
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revision of the class action rule, Redish proposes that—especially in light 
of the faux class action problem—federal judges be required to consider, as 
part of the class certification process, whether success in the class 
proceeding is likely to result in real (i.e., money), as opposed to sham (like 
gift cards for the defendants’ business), relief to the class.16 He also has 
advocated that the current Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out regime be replaced with an 
opt-in procedure over time to ensure informed consent to aggregate 
settlements. 
Professor Redish’s thoroughgoing critique of Rule 23 considerably 
elevated the debate surrounding aggregate litigation because it was 
grounded in the context of democratic theory and encouraged rule revisers 
and commentators alike to question core values of aggregate dispute 
resolution. Until Redish focused the debate on fundamental principles, 
virtually all class action commentary centered on increasingly narrow 
doctrinal disputes. Redish rightly rechanneled the aggregate litigation 
debate into elemental issues of justice, fairness, and constitutional due 
process. 
These insights are collected and expanded in Professor Redish’s major 
contribution to the aggregate litigation debate, his 2009 book Wholesale 
Justice, which reflects more than fifteen years of scholarly research and 
deliberation on the problem of class litigation. His seminal work in this 
field paralleled the efforts of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules to 
amend Rule 23 in the 1990s and illuminated many of the public and 
academic debates surrounding those considerable efforts. However, almost 
in tandem with the development of Redish’s critique, Special Master 
Kenneth Feinberg, also originally of considerable class action pedigree,17 
simultaneously began announcing the death of class action litigation. By 
2011, after his administration of the World Trade Center (WTC) Victim 
Compensation Fund and the BP Gulf Coast Claims Facility (GCCF), 
Feinberg definitively declared that class actions were dead.18 
Feinberg has famously served as the special master overseeing the 
resolution of several aggregate relief funds including Agent Orange, the 
WTC Victim Compensation Fund, and most recently, the BP Gulf Coast 
 
action doctrine maintains, if a class member does nothing, the class member’s lack of action constitutes 
consent to be bound by the class judgment. Professor Redish contends that in all but the narrowest 
circumstances, this negative opt-out procedure by which one withdraws consent is not a valid consent 
and hence an undemocratic imposition upon absent class members. Id. at 172‒73. 
16 Id. at 231. 
17 See Terry Carter, The Master of Disasters: Is it Just Him, or Is Kenneth Feinberg Changing the 
Course of Mass Tort Resolution?, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2011, at 33, 34‒38 (describing Feinberg’s role in the 
Agent Orange and Dalkon Shield class settlements, among other matters); Keith Roberts, An Interview 
with Kenneth Feinberg, JUDGES’ J., Spring 2011, at 4, 4 (describing Feinberg’s participation in crafting 
the Agent Orange settlement). 
18 See Feinberg, supra note †. 
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Claims Facility.19 As a supporter of fund approaches to resolving mass 
claims, Feinberg surveyed the same aggregate litigation landscape as 
Professor Redish―over the same four decades―and declared that the class 
action mechanism for resolving such disputes is moribund.20 Thus, for 
Feinberg, mass tort claimants now live in a world that will be governed by 
fund mechanisms or other nonclass mechanisms. 
Feinberg’s declarations raise provocative questions. First, is the class 
action actually dead, and if so, what are the signs of its demise? Second, if 
the class action is dead, then what killed it? Third, if the class action is 
indeed dead, then what means of aggregate dispute resolution have taken 
its place? And fourth―and most importantly for Professor Redish’s 
work―if the class action is dead, then what is the continued relevance of 
Redish’s carefully crafted critique of class action litigation? 
This Article addresses these four questions. In the first half, this 
Article shows that Ken Feinberg is fundamentally wrong; the class action is 
not dead. Various Cassandras over the past four decades have frequently, 
inaccurately, and repetitively reported the class action’s death. Similar to 
the reports of Mark Twain’s demise, accounts of the class action’s death 
are highly exaggerated. This Article suggests that, far from being dead, 
class action litigation robustly continues in federal and state courts. It 
surveys the various accounts of the class action’s death and explains the 
continued endurance of class litigation in spite of historical setbacks. Class 
action litigation, it turns out, is hard to kill off. In this dynamic class action 
arena, then, Redish’s critiques have continued relevance and vitality. 
The second half of this Article, however, documents the changing 
landscape of aggregate dispute resolution, arguing that the twenty-first 
century has experienced a significant paradigm shift in aggregate dispute 
resolution away from the class action mechanism and towards increased 
use of private claims resolution mechanisms. This portion of the Article 
focuses on the doctrinal evolution of settlement classes, multidistrict 
litigation procedure, contractual nonclass settlements, the quasi-class 
action, and fund approaches to mass claim resolution. 
Finally, the Article critically evaluates the paradigm shift to these 
various private aggregate dispute resolution mechanisms and concludes 
that Professor Redish’s critique of class action litigation has even greater 
relevance in the new world of nonclass, contractual aggregate claim 
resolution and fund approaches to disposing of massive liabilities. With the 
paradigm shift towards innovative nonclass aggregate claims resolution, the 
arc of history may indeed be bending towards greater injustice―a 
phenomenon that should raise concerns, if not alarms. Therefore, the same 
 
19 See Linda S. Mullenix, Prometheus Unbound: The Gulf Coast Claims Facility as a Means for 
Resolving Mass Tort Claims—A Fund Too Far, 71 LA. L. REV. 819, 820–21 (2011); see also Carter, 
supra note 17, at 38. 
20 See Feinberg, supra note †. 
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issues that undergirded Redish’s disquiet over Rule 23 class litigation―and 
especially class settlements―are even more significant for aggregate claim 
resolution that is largely unbounded by rules and unmoored from judicial 
oversight. 
I. THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THE CLASS ACTION: THE DEATH OF  
CLASS ACTIONS (I) 
A. The Life Cycle of the Class Action (Death #1) 
It is entirely fair to suggest that the original class action rule—that 
promulgated with the original Federal Rules in 1938—did die once, killed 
off by its very rulemakers in the early 1960s. The first death of the class 
action rule may perhaps most accurately be apprehended as a true demise. 
By the early 1960s, jurists, litigators, and the rulemakers recognized that 
the original rule had long outgrown its initial conception and become a 
dysfunctional mechanism for resolving aggregate disputes.21 As is well 
documented, the original Rule 23 class categories of “pure,” “hybrid,” and 
“spurious” class actions confounded useful or consistent application of the 
rule.22 Problems of class categorization, though, were among many other 
problems endemic to the original rule.23 
Because of this doctrinal confusion, litigants largely eschewed the 
class action, and class litigation played no prominent (or even subsidiary) 
role during the first twenty-five years of practice under the Federal Rules. 
In addition, the original rule famously contained no provision for a class 
seeking damages,24 and federal law itself embraced few sweeping 
legislative mandates that would have provided the substantive basis for 
pursuing group remedies through a class action. In short, there was little 
felt need for group remedies. Aggregate litigation, as we know it today, did 
not exist. 
By the early 1960s, the reformers then populating the Advisory 
Committee on Civil Rules committed the first homicidal attack on the class 
 
21 See 7A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1752‒1753, at 
18‒54 (3d ed. 2005), for a good history of the original Rule 23 and the doctrinal interpretation problems 
inspired by that version of the rule. This narrative history also describes the growing recognition of the 
need for a rule revision by the early 1960s and describes how the 1966 revisions replaced the former 
class action rule with what was essentially a new rule. See id. § 1753, at 42‒46. 
22 See id. § 1753, at 43. 
23 See id. § 1753, at 43–44. 
24 Rule 23(b)(3) was added in 1966, and according to the Advisory Committee’s note, it allows 
class actions for damages when certain conditions are met. In contrast, Rules 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) 
were meant to address primarily nonmonetary claims for relief. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)‒(3) & advisory 
committee’s note to 1966 amendment. 
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action rule,25 completely rewriting it.26 In addition, the enactment of 
sweeping substantive federal legislation during this same period that 
created new rights and remedies27 provided the rulemakers with further 
impetus for reforming the class action to provide a procedural mechanism 
for enforcing the newly created rights. The rulemakers’ somewhat 
revolutionary concept was their perceived ability to harness procedural 
means to enforce newly created substantive rights. 
B. Class Actions Revivified, 1966 
1966 marked the first back-from-the-dead moment for class action 
litigation. The rewritten rule now contained supposedly clear and 
“functional” class categories, replacing the old, difficult-to-apply class 
concepts.28 The 1966 rule famously created, for the first time, the Rule 
23(b)(3) damage class action.29 In addition, the new Rule 23(b)(2) provided 
classes a means for pursuing injunctive and declaratory relief, which played 
an important role in enforcing the sweeping federal legislation enacted 
during the Johnson and Nixon presidencies. 
The promulgation of the 1966 class action rule ushered in a golden age 
of class action litigation.30 Hence, from 1966 and throughout the ensuing 
decade, attorneys realized that they could employ the new class action rule, 
especially the Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive relief provision, to enforce an array 
of group rights. During this period, the era of institutional reform litigation 
or “public law” litigation was created, transforming the litigation landscape 
 
25 The 1966 revision of Rule 23 was actually part of a larger “package” of rule reforms that 
addressed and revised almost all of the so-called joinder rules, including Rules 13, 14, 18, 19, 20, 22, 
and 24. 
26 As can best be determined, and through some oral history of rulemaking, Rule 23 is the only 
original rule of the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to be rewritten in its entirety rather than 
simply amended from its original version. 
27 Much of this legislation between 1964 and the late 1960s was part of President Lyndon Baines 
Johnson’s Great Society program, including the enactment of various Civil Rights Acts, the Voting 
Rights Act, housing legislation, Title VII employment discrimination legislation, and more. This change 
in the domestic legislative landscape, and its effect on federal rulemaking and judicial decisionmaking, 
was documented in the famous article by Professor Abram Chayes. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the 
Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976). 
28 See 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21, § 1752, at 21‒42 (describing the previous 
classifications—true, hybrid, and spurious class actions—and the difficulties courts had in applying 
them). 
29 As will be explained below, the Rule 23(b)(3) damage class action did not attain real prominence 
until the 1980s and 1990s during the era of class action mass tort litigation. For the first decade after 
promulgation of the 1966 rule, injunctive and declaratory relief class actions reigned supreme. See 
discussion infra Part I.D. 
30 See, e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL 26, 33‒34 (1986) (describing the golden 
era of class action litigation in the 1960s and 1970s after promulgation of the 1966 class action rule by 
the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and Congress). 
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forever.31 Between 1966 and the mid-1970s, federal courts were 
transformed by the influx of massive class action cases seeking remediation 
for alleged violations of various constitutional, federal, and state laws.32 
C. The Death of the Class Action, 1970s (Death #2) 
Professor Arthur Miller has accurately observed that federal 
rulemaking, as well as the response to federal rulemaking, is a pendulum-
like phenomenon.33 Thus, after the Advisory Committee promulgates a rule 
amendment, courts and litigants predictably experience an upswing in 
enthusiasm over (and use of) the new rule, followed inevitably by a 
reaction to correct for that initial, over-enthusiastic endorsement of the rule 
revision. Eventually, Miller has noted, sanity prevails and federal 
procedure swings back to equilibrium.34 
Consistent with Professor Miller’s pendulum account, the 1960s burst 
of passion for the new 1966 rule inevitably resulted in a class action 
backlash. Some commentators suggested this backlash reflected resistance 
to and bias against plaintiffs’ civil rights actions.35 By the early 1970s, 
enthusiasm for the class action mechanism had waned, and in some 
quarters, at least, was greeted with growing hostility. 
 
31 See Chayes, supra note 27, at 1281‒84. In this famous article, Professor Chayes documented the 
shift in the litigation landscape from what he deemed the “traditional” civil case to the modern 
institutional public law reform litigation. According to Chayes’s description, the previous traditional 
civil case was characterized by: (1) a lawsuit that was bipolar, (2) litigation that was retrospective, 
(3) litigation where the right and remedy were interdependent, (4) a lawsuit that was a self-contained 
episode, and (5) a party-initiated and party-controlled process. Id. at 1282‒83. The new public law 
model of litigation was characterized by: (1) a process that was “sprawling and amorphous,” 
(2) litigation that was subject to change over the course of proceedings, (3) a process that was “suffused 
and intermixed with negotiating and mediating,” (4) a judge who was “the dominant figure in 
organizing and guiding the case,” and (5) ongoing judicial involvement in remedies. Id. at 1284. The 
Chayes article, published ten years after the promulgation of the 1966 class action rule, was 
retrospectively commenting on the new era of litigation that the 1966 class action rule enabled and in 
effect helped to create. 
32 See Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the 
“Class Action Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 670‒76 (1979) (noting an influx of class actions in the 
decade after the 1966 amendments to Rule 23); see also Developments in the Law—Class Actions, 
89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1325 n.30 (1976) (noting that the largest group of class actions on federal 
dockets were civil rights cases, comprising approximately 50% of cases for the years 1973‒1976). 
33 I have heard Professor Miller provide this description at several procedure conferences. 
34 This certainly was true of the Advisory Committee’s amendment of Rule 11 and the sanctioning 
provision in 1983, whose enthusiastic judicial implementation in the 1980s subsequently led to a major 
counter revolt and revision of that rule one decade later in 1993, thereby restoring sanity to federal 
sanctioning for pleading offenses. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment 
(“This revision is intended to remedy problems that have arisen in the interpretation and application of 
the 1983 revision of the rule. . . . The revision . . . places greater constraints on the imposition of 
sanctions and should reduce the number of motions for sanctions presented to the court.”). 
35 The theory that repeated historical backlash against class litigation is a reflection of antiliberal 
bias has been a consistent theme of class action advocates since at least 1966. 
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Two landmark Supreme Court decisions between 1973 and 1974 
highlighted the developing doctrinal reaction, and both decisions had an 
impact on the viability of certain types of class actions. Thus, in Eisen v. 
Carlisle & Jacquelin,36 the Court determined that class plaintiffs must pay 
the costs of sending notice to absent class members,37 and in Zahn v. 
International Paper Co., the Court ruled that in diversity-based class 
actions, each class member must individually satisfy the amount-in-
controversy requirement.38 
Eisen and Zahn combined to hobble enthusiasm for class litigation. 
Given the extremely high cost of notice, some plaintiffs’ attorneys avoided 
pursuing the Rule 23(b)(3) classes that require it.39 Zahn, which effectively 
instituted a famous “no aggregation” rule, impaired the ability of plaintiffs 
to pursue large class actions where individual class members failed to have 
substantial damages.40 By the late 1970s, several commentators, noting the 
effects of Eisen and Zahn, lamented the slow death of the class action.41 
The combined Eisen and Zahn decisions—affecting diversity and Rule 
23(b)(3) class actions—signaled a slackening of the class litigation 
juggernaut as litigants and attorneys regrouped to evaluate how to proceed. 
By the end of the 1970s, and somewhat as a consequence of Eisen and 
Zahn, formerly robust class litigation gradually slipped into partial eclipse. 
The Cassandras were again pronouncing the death of class actions. 
 
36 417 U.S. 156 (1974). 
37 See id. at 178‒79. 
38 414 U.S. 291, 292 (1973). The Zahn decision created the interesting anomaly that in diversity 
cases, courts need only look to the citizenship of the class representatives and the defendants to 
establish diversity of citizenship but must look to each individual class member’s damages to establish 
the requisite amount in controversy. See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 365‒66 
(1921). 
39 Hysteria over the Eisen decision may have been overstated, however, because the impact of the 
so-called Eisen notice rule on class litigation was limited to Rule 23(b)(3) damage class actions. See 
Eisen, 417 U.S. at 173. Injunctive civil rights actions pursued under Rule 23(b)(2), which do not require 
notice to class members, remained unaffected. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c). 
40 It would take nearly thirty-five years for one Supreme Court decision, and the congressional 
enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in 
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.), to effectively overrule the Court’s nonaggregation decision in Zahn. 
See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 566‒67 (2005) (overruling Zahn in 
diversity class actions). The Act added 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2006), which provides an amount-in-
controversy requirement for diversity class actions of $5 million dollars, and § 1332(d)(6), which 
expressly authorizes individual damages to be aggregated to achieve the requisite amount in 
controversy, effectively abrogating Zahn’s nonaggregation rule. 
41 See Paul A. Freund, The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REV. 13, 47 (1974) (noting 
that Eisen and Zahn severely limited availability and effectiveness of federal class actions); Miller, 
supra note 32, at 679 (noting that class actions have bleaker prospects since Eisen and Zahn); Glenn A. 
Danas, Comment, The Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999: Another Congressional Attempt 
to Federalize State Law, 49 EMORY L.J. 1305, 1312 (2000) (arguing that the Court acted in accord with 
the “reactive tide” by handing down restrictive decisions in Eisen and Zahn). 
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D. Class Actions Reinvigorated—Mass Tort Litigation, 1980s 
As it turns out, the class action’s second death was not long-lived. In 
the late 1970s, when the Eisen and Zahn decisions were hindering plaintiffs 
in civil rights litigation, the era of mass tort litigation dawned. It would 
dominate the litigation landscape for more than two decades. 
The emergence of the mass tort phenomenon in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s has been well documented in the general and scholarly 
literature; the three seminal mass torts that engaged the attention of the 
bench and bar centered on asbestos, Agent Orange, and the Dalkon Shield 
litigations.42 Significantly, both the Agent Orange and Dalkon Shield 
litigations were resolved through class action settlements;43 in the ensuing 
decades, plaintiffs’ attorneys would repeatedly attempt to certify asbestos 
class actions, with mixed success.44 
Mass tort litigation presented a relatively new type of aggregate 
litigation: individual tort damage claims pursued by thousands or tens of 
thousands of claimants allegedly injured by exposure to a toxic substance, 
consumption of a pharmaceutical, or use of an allegedly defective medical 
device. Until the late 1970s, tort claims had been pursued on an individual, 
case-by-case basis. But with massive exposure to toxic chemicals such as 
Agent Orange, the pervasive incidence of asbestos-related illness, and the 
large numbers of women (and men) suffering adverse effects of 
pharmaceuticals or medical devices, plaintiffs’ attorneys turned to 
procedural means for aggregating the claims. 
The dominant legal debate of the 1980s and 1990s focused on the use 
of the class action to resolve mass tort litigation.45 Virtually every 
institutional reform organization—including the American Bar Association, 
the American Law Institute, the Rand Institute for Civil Justice, the Federal 
Judicial Center, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, and the 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws—studied the problems of mass tort 
 
42 See LINDA S. MULLENIX, MASS TORT LITIGATION 2–20 (2d ed. 2008) (presenting an overview 
of and related commentary on the three seminal mass tort litigations). 
43 See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 174 (2d Cir. 1987) (approving class 
certification and fairness of subsequent settlement); In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 752 (4th Cir. 
1989) (approving class certification and settlement). A.H. Robins Co., the manufacturer of the Dalkon 
Shield and sole defendant in that litigation, subsequently went into bankruptcy, forcing resolution of the 
Dalkon Shield claims through bankruptcy. See, e.g., Comm. of Dalkon Shield Claimants v. A.H. Robins 
Co., 828 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1987). 
44 See, e.g., In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 712 (5th Cir. 1990) (reversing class certification 
of a Rule 23(b)(3) asbestos class action); Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 475 (5th Cir. 
1986) (upholding class certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out asbestos class limited to claimants in the 
Eastern District of Texas). 
45 See MULLENIX, supra note 42, at 132‒44 (documenting various cases and materials involved in 
the 1970s through the late 1980s and judicial decisions relating to whether mass torts could be certified 
in class action litigation pursuant to Rule 23). 
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litigation and issued proposals for reform.46 Federal and state courts 
contributed greatly to the debate, often rendering conflicting decisions 
concerning the ability of mass tort litigants to certify class actions under all 
different categories of the rule, state and federal.47 As courts and 
commentators documented, the major obstacle to judicial certification of 
mass tort cases was the 1966 Advisory Committee note to Rule 23(b)(3), 
which suggested that the class action rule was not suitable for use in tort 
litigation.48 Nonetheless, the sheer volume of mass tort cases inundating the 
federal and state courts, the duplicate and expensive nature of this 
litigation, and the added costs of time and delay, created a crisis mentality 
in the judiciary, which resulted in efforts to revitalize the class action.49 
Initially, the federal judiciary resisted use of the class action rule to 
aggregate mass tort cases, but by the early 1980s—and especially following 
Judge Jack Weinstein’s approval of the Agent Orange settlement class in 
198450—courts began reappraising their resistance to mass tort class actions 
and began certifying mass tort classes. By the mid-1980s and into the early 
1990s, bolstered by landmark asbestos class action decisions from the 
Second, Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits,51 federal courts that had once 
eschewed mass tort class actions instead embraced them as efficient and 
economical. Collectively, these decisions—coupled with dozens more from 
lower federal courts—substantially resuscitated class litigation and ushered 
in an adventuresome era of judicial innovation and experimentation. This 
 
46 See LINDA S. MULLENIX, MASS TORT LITIGATION viii–xii (1st ed. 1996) (listing efforts by 
various institutional law reform bodies studying the problem of mass tort litigation). 
47 With varying success, plaintiffs sought class certification of mass tort actions under Rules 
23(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), (b)(2), and (b)(3). In addition, numerous plaintiffs sought to circumvent the 
more stringent requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) by seeking class certification of “limited issues” classes 
under Rule 23(c)(4)(A). For a survey history of these various attempted uses of the class action rule 
during the 1980s and 1990s, see MULLENIX, supra note 42, at 150‒77. 
48 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s note (“A ‘mass accident’ resulting in injuries 
to numerous persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood that 
significant questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses of liability, would be present, 
affecting the individuals in different ways.”). 
49 See, e.g., Jenkins, 782 F.2d at 473 (noting the mass tort litigation crisis and famously concluding 
that “[n]ecessity moves us to change and invent”). 
50 See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 174 (2d Cir. 1987) (approving Judge 
Weinstein’s class certification of the Agent Orange class and settlement fund). 
51 See, e.g., Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 787 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding a mass tort 
settlement of claims arising from the Marcos regime in the Philippines and using statistical sampling to 
calculate damages); Watson v. Shell Oil Co., 979 F.2d 1014, 1020‒23 (5th Cir. 1992) (upholding the 
certification of a class of claimants injured by an oil refinery explosion); In re Agent Orange, 818 F.2d 
at 174; In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1011 (3d Cir. 1986) (upholding certification of a 
nationwide class of school districts seeking compensation for asbestos remediation in school buildings); 
Jenkins, 782 F.2d at 469, 475 (upholding class certification of asbestos personal injury claimants); 
Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 666‒67 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (approving certification of 
class of asbestos personal injury claimants and approving the statistical sampling method of calculating 
damages), vacated in part, 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998). 
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included such novel devices as applying statistical extrapolation from 
individual cases to estimate class-wide damages.52 
It also should be noted that with the rise of enthusiasm for class 
litigation in the mid-1980s and early 1990s, plaintiffs’ attorneys also 
breathed new life into consumer class actions and securities fraud class 
actions, both pursued as Rule 23(b)(3) damage classes. Thus, in this era, 
class litigation pivoted away from plaintiffs’ civil rights actions and 
institutional reform litigation and toward mass tort, small claims, and 
securities class actions. This was class litigation’s second “golden age,” 
characterized by a different substantive provenance than the first golden 
age of the 1960s. 
E. Are Class Actions Dead? (Deaths #3, 4, 5, and 6) 
By the mid-1990s, however, inevitable class action resentment struck 
the corporate, political, judicial, and legislative arenas, launching a new 
decade of class action retrenchment.53 The cry of “Basta!” resounded from 
aggressive class action critics, including the usual suspects: namely, the 
defendants.54 Thus, from the mid-1990s and for the ensuing decade, several 
judicial decisions and legislative initiatives effectively braked class 
litigation, causing class action Cassandras to again sound the cry that class 
litigation was dead.55 
1. The Laws of Procedural Physics: The 1990s Judicial Rule 23 
Retrenchment (Death #3).—As indicated above, by the laws of 
procedural physics, for every action, inevitably there is an equal and 
opposite reaction, and after a decade of expansive, creative, innovative, and 
adventuresome use of the class action rule, federal judicial reaction set in 
with a vengeance in the mid-1990s.56 In particular, several influential 
 
52 See, e.g., Hilao, 103 F.3d at 787. 
53 Not coincidentally, this class action reaction occurred during the presidencies of Ronald Reagan 
and George H.W. Bush, at a time of substantial Republican legislative majorities who promulgated the 
Contract with America, which advocated for civil justice and tort reform, including limits on or 
elimination of class action litigation (among other reforms). See CONTRACT WITH AMERICA (Ed 
Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994). 
54 Again, not surprisingly, the critics of expansive and innovative use of the class action rule 
(especially when applied to resolve mass tort and small claims damage class actions) included corporate 
defendants, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, like-minded lobbying groups, and most 
Republicans. 
55 See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995). 
56 The revolt of the federal courts against mass tort class certifications in the mid-1990s was 
presaged by the Fifth Circuit’s repudiation of the original trial plan in Cimino v. Raymark Industries, 
Inc., 739 F. Supp. 328, in an appeal styled In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1990). 
Notwithstanding the court’s repudiation of the class action trial plan, Judge Parker nonetheless after 
remand went forward with a combined Rule 42 and class action procedure. See Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 
766‒67. The ensuing trial and jury verdicts in that case were successfully appealed and repudiated by 
the Fifth Circuit in Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297. 
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appellate courts issued landmark decisions in 1995 and 1996 that heralded 
the third death of the class action rule. The 1995‒1996 appellate judicial 
rebellion is well-known to all class action practitioners and was heralded by 
Judge Richard Posner’s famous decision in In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer 
Inc.,57 which reversed the certification under Rule 23(b)(3) of a nationwide 
class of hemophiliac purchasers of tainted blood products. Among other 
reasons, Judge Posner opined that this mass tort could not satisfy the class 
action requirements for predominance of common questions,58 involved 
intractable choice of law issues, violated the Erie doctrine,59 and potentially 
violated the plaintiffs’ Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury.60 In 
addition, Judge Posner objected to certification of a premature mass tort, 
which he believed unfairly tilted the litigation playing field against the 
corporate defendants.61 Judge Posner’s Rhone-Poulenc decision was of 
particular importance because it provided a roadmap for future defense 
challenges to mass tort as well as other class litigation. 
In a domino-like reaction, several other appellate courts struck down 
various mass tort class certifications in 1996. These included the Fifth 
Circuit’s resounding repudiation of the largest class action to date, a fifty 
million-person nationwide class of nicotine addicts in Castano v. American 
Tobacco Co.,62 in which the Fifth Circuit largely relied on Rhone-
Poulenc.63 In turn, the Sixth Circuit overturned certification of a class of 
penile implant claimants,64 and the Third Circuit reversed settlements of a 
GMC pick-up truck class65 as well as the first global asbestos deal.66 These 
decisions also collectively lectured federal judges to apply a “rigorous 
analysis”67 to the class certification inquiry, further tightening the belt on 
the era of relatively free-wheeling, drive-by class certifications prevalent in 
the 1980s. 
Moreover, by the end of the decade, the Supreme Court issued the 
ultimate death blow to the 1980s laissez-faire class litigation in its twin 
 
57 51 F.3d at 1304. 
58 Here, the district judge had clearly agreed, as the suit was not certified as a Rule 23(b)(3) class; 
“[i]nstead the judge certified the suit ‘as a class action with respect to particular issues’ only.” Id. at 
1297 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4)(A)). 
59 See id. at 1300–02. 
60 Id. at 1302–04. 
61 See id. at 1299–1300. 
62 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996). 
63 See, e.g., id. at 751. 
64 In re Am. Medical Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996). 
65 In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 
1995). 
66 Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996). 
67 See, e.g., Castano, 84 F.3d at 740 (“A district court must conduct a rigorous analysis of the Rule 
23 prerequisites before certifying a class.”). 
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decisions Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor68 and Ortiz v. Fibreboard 
Corp.69 In rejecting nationwide asbestos class settlements under both Rule 
23(b)(3) and Rule 23(b)(1)(B), the Court effectively required heightened 
judicial scrutiny for settlement classes, redefined adequacy and due process 
requirements, and frustrated the ability of litigants to certify “limited fund” 
class actions.70 The Court’s Amchem decision became the benchmark for all 
subsequent class certification decisions, and for all practical purposes, Ortiz 
interred the limited fund class action.71 
More grimly, as a policy matter—and no doubt with a skeptical eye to 
many of the innovative lower court decisions issued in the previous 
decade—the Court warned the lower federal courts against any further 
adventuresome uses of the class action rule. To emphatically make its 
point, the Court suggested that any further class action adventures 
conceivably (and unconstitutionally) might violate the Rules Enabling 
Act.72 
Thus, the 1999 Ortiz decision effectively terminated the great decade 
of entertaining and riveting class action adventures. By the end of the 
1990s, commentators once again declared that class actions were dead. 
2. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (Death 
#4).—In the midst of the judicial class action revolt of the mid-
1990s, class action opponents actively pursued a multifront campaign 
against class litigation. This attack included federal legislative initiatives to 
fill gaps where judicial decisions alone would not suffice to hobble class 
litigation. These legislative initiatives took two forms: restricting securities 
class actions and levitating irksome state class actions out of “hellhole state 
courts”73 into presumably more defendant-favoring federal courts (where 
 
68 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
69 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
70 The “limited fund” class action is one where many people have a claim against a single fund that 
is too small to cover all the claims. The class action, in a manner somewhat similar to a constructive 
trust, brings all the claims together to ensure that no single claimant exhausts the fund. See id. at 834. 
71 As of this writing, in the twelve years since the Court announced its decision in Ortiz, there have 
been relatively few certifications of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) limited fund class actions, largely due to the three 
factors Justice Souter indicated had to be satisfied for courts to approve such class actions. See id. at 
838‒41 (describing the three factors: (1) total liquidated claims definitely exceed the fund available to 
satisfy them, (2) the entire fund is to be distributed to satisfy the claims, and (3) pro rata distribution to 
claimants on a common theory of recovery). 
72 See, e.g., id. at 845–46 (warning of potential Rules Enabling Act violations and counseling 
against any further adventuresome uses of the class action rule). 
73 I am not making this up. This colorful term was widely used (and is still used) by class action 
defense counsel to describe a list of local plaintiff-favoring state court forums characterized by so-
called drive-by certification procedures and accommodating settlement judges. See, e.g., AM. TORT 
REFORM FOUND., JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2011‒2012 (2011), available at http://www.judicialhellholes.
org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Judicial-Hellholes-2011.pdf; see also Joseph M. Nixon, The Purpose, 
History and Five Year Effect of Recent Lawsuit Reform in Texas, ADVOCATE, Fall 2008, at 9, 10‒14 
(describing the basis for certain counties in Texas becoming known as judicial hellholes). But cf. PUB. 
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proposed class actions ostensibly would be killed off by more restrictive 
class certification standards). The sponsors of these legislative efforts were 
successful, adding fuel to class action funeral pyres #4 and #5. 
Through the early 1990s, securities class action litigation proliferated, 
spearheaded by a highly dedicated and experienced plaintiffs’ bar. 
Moreover, the standards for certifying securities classes were famously lax, 
requiring merely the existence of a single class representative owning a 
single share of a company’s stock.74 These lax standards led attorneys to 
troll business pages and stock tickers for drops in securities prices and 
eventually led to unethical solicitation of willing plaintiffs to represent 
derivative class actions.75 Consequently, the ease of pursuing securities 
derivative class litigation contributed to the bane of “strike suits,”76 in 
which corporate defendants willingly settled claims rather than incur the 
cost and burden of defending them. 
By the early 1990s, corporate resistance to securities strike suits led to 
congressional enactment in 1995 of the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act (PSLRA),77 which Congress amended in 1998.78 The general 
thrust of the PSLRA and its amendments was to make it more difficult to 
pursue securities class litigation.79 The PSLRA embodies heightened 
substantive amendments to the securities laws combined with procedural 
reforms.80 Among many changes, the Act created a presumption that a class 
be represented by the largest institutional investor rather than a shareholder 
 
CITIZEN, CLASS ACTION “JUDICIAL HELLHOLES”: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IS LACKING 2–4 (2005), 
available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/OutlierReport.pdf (critiquing the claims of existence of 
counties particularly unfriendly to defendants or corporations); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Judicial 
Hellholes, Lawsuit Climates, and Bad Social Science: Lessons from West Virginia, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 
1097 (2008) (arguing that the hellhole label is often used disingenuously by corporate interests in an 
attempt at political capture). 
74 Shareholder derivative litigation also supplied class action jurisprudence with the famous Mrs. 
Dora Surowitz, of know-nothing fame, who was deemed to be an adequate class representative even 
though she knew nothing about her claims, her case, or the English language. See Surowitz v. Hilton 
Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 364–67 (1966). 
75 At least some renowned securities class action lawyers went to jail for these practices. 
76 See Surowitz, 363 U.S. at 371. 
77 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). See generally Joel Seligman, The Private 
Securities Reform Act of 1995, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 717 (1996) (describing the history and enactment of 
the PSLRA). 
78 Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
79 The Act included a “safe harbor” provision, as well, which insulated securities defendants from 
liability based on ultimately unrealized projections of future business success. See Seligman, supra note 
77, at 722–24. 
80 See ROBERT H. KLONOFF ET AL., CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER MULTI-PARTY LITIGATION 
868‒72 (3d ed. 2012) (describing the PSLRA, with accompanying illustrative cases and materials). 
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owning a single share of stock.81 The PSLRA also includes “heightened” 
pleading requirements. 
Parallel to the judicial reaction against mass tort class actions (and 
mixing metaphors), the PSLRA represented another nail in the class action 
coffin at the end of the 1990s. Congressional amendment of the PSLRA in 
1998 was bracketed by the Supreme Court’s 1997 decision in Amchem and 
its 1999 decision in Ortiz. The anticipated effect of this class action trifecta, 
presumably, was to cripple and dispatch mass tort, consumer, and securities 
class actions. 
3. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (Death #5).—The PSLRA 
was not the only legislative assault on class action litigation in the late 
1990s. One of the ironic unintended consequences of the appellate revolt of 
1995–1996 was to induce the plaintiffs’ bar to recalibrate its litigation 
strategy. Hence, in reaction to the Fifth Circuit’s Castano decision,82 a 
member of the plaintiffs’ Castano consortium famously said (somewhat to 
this effect): “Fine. If the federal courts don’t like our class actions, then we 
will file separate cases in every state court.”83 
Thus, after suffering a number of significant jurisprudential setbacks 
in class certification efforts in 1995–1996, the plaintiffs’ bar largely 
abandoned federal forums for state ones,84 focusing especially on a well-
known list of sympathetic local courts.85 State trial and appellate courts, as 
it turned out, provided considerably more lax class certification standards 
than their sister federal courts.86 In states with elected judiciaries, the class 
 
81 PSLRA § 27(a)(3)(B)(iii), 109 Stat. at 737‒38 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 77z-1(b) 
(2006)). 
82 Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996). 
83 I do not have an authoritative source for this quote, but I was there then and remember it very 
well, especially for its entirely correct prophetic value. 
84 This is not to suggest that there were virtually no federal class actions during the late 1990s, but 
throughout the period following 1995, there was a marked upswing in state court class action filings. 
85 During this period, various groups of defense attorneys kept lists of the ten most notorious class 
litigation hellholes, which lists were routinely trotted out at defense bar conferences. Repeatedly, four 
Texas county courts made the top-ten list. Perhaps the most famous of hellhole jurisdictions was 
Madison County, Illinois, then famed for its close to 100% class certification and settlement record. Cf., 
e.g., AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., supra note 73, at 4 (“[Madison County] ha[s] come a long way since 
hitting rock bottom.”); see also Victor E. Schwartz et al., Asbestos Litigation in Madison County, 
Illinois: The Challenge Ahead, 16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 235, 240 (2004) (describing Madison County 
as an attractive forum for plaintiffs’ lawyers due to particular judicial amenability to class certification). 
86 During this period, the most infamous procedure was the drive-by certification where, in some 
venues, it was entirely possible for a courier to run a class complaint into the clerk’s office, where it 
was routinely certified on the pleadings and without further ado. The practice of drive-by certification 
has largely abated in state court, and it is difficult to imagine a drive-by certification occurring in 
federal court today. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical 
Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1507‒09 & n.270 (2008) (discussing drive-by 
class certifications and other perceived problems that led to the enactment of CAFA); Nan S. Ellis, The 
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: The Story Behind the Statute, 35 J. LEGIS. 76, 93–95 (2009) 
(discussing same); David Marcus, Erie, The Class Action Fairness Act, and Some Federalism 
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action problem was often exacerbated by judges pandering to popular 
sentiment in favor of penalizing corporate defendants.87 Moreover, existing 
federal jurisdiction and removal provisions made it exceedingly difficult 
for the corporate defendants to remove the cases to federal court.88 
By the late 1990s, corporate defendants had had enough of state 
courts. Thus, in 1997–1998, congressional sympathizers introduced 
legislation to change the jurisdictional rules relating to class actions. After 
eight years and multiple revised bills, Congress finally enacted the Class 
Action Fairness Act (CAFA) in 2005.89 The legislative history to CAFA,90 
published several months later, contained a scathing description of the 
problems with state courts that had induced Congress to act. 
CAFA did two major things: (1) it created a new federal jurisdiction91 
and (2) it created a new removal provision, both especially tailored for 
class actions.92 CAFA’s enactment had largely been driven by corporate 
and Republican political interests, and the core purpose of CAFA 
 
Implications of Diversity Jurisdiction, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV 1247, 1294 (2007) (describing the 
phenomenon of drive-by certifications, noting that the Alabama Supreme Court put an end to this 
practice in 1997). 
87 See Schwartz et al., supra note 85. This is not in any way intended to impugn, disparage, or even 
call into question the honesty, integrity, expertise, judgment, or ethical standards of elected judges. 
However, as the political science literature on elected judiciaries educates us, there are some regrettable 
lapses in judicial judgment and temperament among elected state judges. Decisionmaking with regard 
to class action litigation, with its potential extensive reach among the populace, has not proven immune 
from these sorts of problems. 
88 Among other problems, the Zahn nonaggregation rule repeatedly frustrated removal attempts in 
diversity cases where individual class members could not satisfy the $75,000 amount-in-controversy 
requirement. See supra notes 38‒41 and accompanying text. Because diversity class actions were 
largely based on state law tort and other claims, state class actions were difficult to remove. In addition, 
plaintiffs’ attorneys carefully pleaded around citizenship requirements to ensure there were nondiverse 
parties to defeat removal attempts. All these maneuvers were largely successful in keeping state-filed 
class actions in state court. 
89 See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in 
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). Significantly, the Class Action Fairness Act was enacted and signed 
into law on February 18, 2005, less than a month after the second inauguration of President George W. 
Bush. It was the very first piece of legislation signed into law by President Bush, thereby completing a 
tactical promise to Bush’s Republican and corporate supporters to do something about the dire class 
action situation burdening corporate America. Cf., e.g., Transcripts: President Bush’s Remarks on 
Class Action Reform, MADISON-ST. CLAIR REC. (Feb. 10, 2005, 7:00 AM), http://madisonrecord.com/
news/143826-transcripts-president-bushs-remarks-on-class-action-reform. 
90 See S. Rep. No. 109-14 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3. 
91 See CAFA § 4, 119 Stat. at 9 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2006)). Generally, in order to 
establish federal jurisdiction for a class action, the proponents must establish three things: (1) diversity 
of citizenship among the parties, (2) at least one hundred members in the proposed class, and (3) an 
amount in controversy equal to or exceeding $5 million. As in prior jurisprudence, the diversity 
requirement among parties continues to require only minimal diversity. CAFA did, however, overrule 
Zahn and permit the aggregation of damages among class members to reach the $5 million threshold for 
jurisdiction. See discussion supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
92 See 28 U.S.C. § 1453 (providing the rule for the removal of class actions). 
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(notwithstanding its high-minded legislative title) was to create a 
procedural means for getting vexatious class actions out of state court and 
back into federal court, where corporate defendants believed they were 
more likely to win. 
It is perhaps worth noting that, with a nice degree of historical 
symmetry—not to mention pendulum effects, the laws of procedural 
physics, and other such metaphors—CAFA was finally enacted exactly a 
decade after the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Rhone-Poulenc and after 
nearly a decade of defendant exposure to state court class action 
jurisprudence. Thus, after they were drummed by state courts, CAFA 
finally restored corporate interests’ access to the more hospitable federal 
courts, which a decade prior had rendered the corporate-favoring class 
jurisprudence of the 1995–1996 revolt. 
Among savvy class action observers and semiastute political analysts, 
CAFA therefore represented another victory for the corporate and defense 
bar. CAFA, then, supplied yet another opportunity for the class action 
Cassandras to proclaim the death of the class action rule.93 
4. Wal-Mart v. Dukes, AT&T v. Concepcion, and Access to Justice 
(Death #6).—If things were not bad enough for class litigation 
following CAFA, then the Supreme Court presumably issued it the ultimate 
coup de main in its twin 2011 decisions in AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion94 and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.95 To suggest that these 
decisions embodied some Supreme unfriendliness to class litigation might 
be an understatement. Certainly the plaintiffs’ bar and liberal sympathizers 
read these decisions as constituting outright hostility96 and used them as a 
platform to once again decry the death of class actions (ahem, death #6). In 
addition, class advocates and scholars disappointed in the Court’s holdings 
characterized these decisions as denying access to justice for injured and 
aggrieved plaintiffs.97 
 
93 It is perhaps rather late in this Article to note that the class action Cassandras repeatedly 
announcing (and lamenting) its demise substantially overlap with the plaintiffs’ bar and liberal interest 
groups. This should come as no surprise because it is somewhat difficult to imagine defendants 
lamenting the death of class actions (as in: “I truly regret that I can no longer effectively be sued on a 
massive, corporate-bankrupting basis.”). 
94 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
95 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
96 See, e.g., George Rutherglen, Wal-Mart, AT&T Mobility, and the Decline of the Deterrent Class 
Action, 98 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 24, 31 (2012), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2012/04/14/
Rutherglen.pdf. 
97 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart 
v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 148‒54 (2011). 
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a. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.—In one of the most closely 
watched and highly publicized class action cases in its history,98 the 
Supreme Court decided in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, in a 5–4 
decision, that the certification of the largest female employment 
discrimination case ever, against the country’s largest employer, was an 
abuse of discretion. After Dukes, American corporations facing 
employment discrimination classes no doubt issued a collective sigh of 
relief. More importantly for all class action defendants, though, the Court 
articulated a more stringent standard for class certification generally. 
Specifically, the majority ruling on Rule 23(a)(2) commonality was 
the crux of the Court’s decision and the most significant discussion for 
certification of all future class actions. Rule 23(a)(2) requires that the 
proponents of a class action demonstrate that there are “questions of law or 
fact common to the class.”99 Under prevailing class action jurisprudence, 
most courts in the past have agreed that this standard was easily satisfied, 
requiring the identification of only one common question. 
Justice Scalia confronted this notion of what I refer to as “easy 
commonality” head on. He indicated that the Rule 23(a)(2) requirement 
was easy to misread as permitting plaintiffs to state common questions at 
the highest, most generalized level of abstraction.100 But Justice Scalia also 
indicated that such generalized questions could not pass muster for stating a 
common question under Rule 23(a)(2); “[c]ommonality requires the 
plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members ‘have suffered the same 
injury.’”101 
Applying a more stringent interpretation of Rule 23(a)(2) 
commonality, Justice Scalia concluded that the mere claim by some Wal-
Mart female employees that they had suffered discrimination gave no cause 
to believe that all the women’s claims could be litigated together. The 
Court concluded that the plaintiffs were attempting to sue about literally 
millions of employment decisions at once, noting that “[w]ithout some glue 
holding the alleged reasons for all those decisions together, it will be 
impossible to say that examination of all the class members’ claims for 
relief will produce a common answer to the crucial question why was I 
disfavored.”102 
Perhaps the most important (and controversial) part of the Court’s 
Rule 23(a)(2) commonality analysis focused on the dissimilarities among 
class members in order to ascertain whether even a single common 
question existed to satisfy the commonality requirement. The majority’s 
 
98 This portion of the Article has been adapted from Linda S. Mullenix, Class Action Roundup: A 
Little Something for Everyone, 38 PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT. CAS. 330 (2011). 
99 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2548 (quoting FED R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2)). 
100 See id. at 2551. 
101 Id. (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982)). 
102 Id. at 2552. 
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focus on dissimilarities among class members drew a sharp rebuke from the 
four dissenting Justices.103 Regarding dissimilarities among the Wal-Mart 
class members, the Court, agreeing with Ninth Circuit Judge Kozinski’s 
dissent from the class certification, held that the class embraced too many 
diverse jobs, workplace categories, supervisors, store locations, and 
regional policies. Some women employees “thrived while others did 
poorly. They have little in common but their sex and the lawsuit.”104 
The four liberal Justices (in an opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg) 
concurred that the Wal-Mart class had been improperly certified under 
Rule 23(b)(2) but strongly dissented from the majority’s decision that the 
plaintiffs failed to satisfy Rule 23(a)(2) commonality.105 In essence, the 
dissenters objected to the majority’s ratcheting up of the commonality 
requirement, noting that the Court’s decision “disqualifies the class at the 
starting gate.”106 The dissenters noted, accurately, that the Court’s 
“dissimilarities” standard was far reaching. In addition, the dissenters 
pointed out that the majority’s interpretation of Rule 23(a)(2) commonality, 
with its focus on dissimilarities among class members, essentially 
mimicked the more stringent predominance standard of Rule 23(b)(3). 
Thus, the dissenters stated: “The Court errs in importing a ‘dissimilarities’ 
notion suited to Rule 23(b)(3) into the Rule 23(a) commonality inquiry.”107 
b. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.—In AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion,108 another 5–4 decision authored by Justice Scalia, the 
majority disallowed class-wide arbitration where state contract law would 
otherwise negate a contractual class action waiver. To reach this 
conclusion, the Supreme Court held that California precedent,109 which 
invalidated class action waivers in arbitration agreements, was preempted 
by the Federal Arbitration Act. This led the pundits to declare that 
contractual waivers, now bulletproof thanks to Concepcion, would kill the 
class action (yet again). 
F. Countersigns of Life: Class Actions Resuscitated (Again) 
While it might be tempting to suggest, in light of the 1995–1996 
federal appellate decisions, the PSLRA, CAFA, and the Supreme Court 
 
103 See id. at 2562 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
104 Id. at 2557 (majority opinion) (quoting Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 652 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2541). 
105 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2561‒62 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
106 Id. at 2562. 
107 Id. at 2567. 
108 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). For further background on the case, see Frank Blechschmidt, Comment, 
All Alone in Arbitration: AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion and the Substantive Impact of Class Action 
Waivers, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (2012). 
109 See Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by AT&T Mobility, 
131 S. Ct. 1740. 
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decisions in Amchem, Ortiz, Wal-Mart, and Concepcion that class actions 
are definitively dead six times over, this would not be precisely accurate. 
Indeed, several indicia suggest that class actions are alive, well, and 
thriving as usual, if, in some quarters, in somewhat modified forms.110 
1. Empirical Indicators.—Whether class actions are dead is capable 
of empirical proof. Any number of scholars and institutions keep track of 
this sort of thing, so it would come as a great surprise to (among others) 
federal judges, the Federal Judicial Center, the Rand Institute for Civil 
Justice,111 Stanford Law School, and various class action scholars to hear 
that class actions are dead. 
The Federal Judicial Center (FJC) has for years conducted several 
empirical studies of the incidence and consequences of class action 
litigation in federal district courts.112 What these studies reveal, not 
surprisingly, is the cyclical waxing and waning of class action filings that 
fairly track historical trends of enthusiasm for, or retrenchment from, class 
litigation. These bean-counting exercises also illustrate keenness for or 
apathy towards certain substantive class actions.113 What the FJC studies do 
not document, however, is the death of class actions, which, despite 
everything, continue to be filed and adjudicated on a fairly constant 
basis.114 
2. Robust PSLRA Litigation and CAFA Class Action Forum 
Shifting.—Advocates of class action litigation greeted both the 
PSLRA and CAFA as not-so-veiled efforts by corporate America and the 
defense bar to stifle class litigation. The view was that the defense bar, 
which had been largely unable to impede class litigation in federal and state 
judicial forums, had turned to legislation to gain some relief from class 
litigation. 
As indicated above, the post-PSLRA and CAFA eras, however, have 
proved otherwise; plaintiffs have continued to file both securities derivative 
 
110 See infra Part II. 
111 See, e.g., DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CLASS ACTION 
DILEMMAS (2000). 
112 See, e.g., BOB NIEMIC & TOM WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., EFFECTS OF AMCHEM/ORTIZ ON 
THE FILING OF FEDERAL CLASS ACTIONS: REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 
(2002), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/amchem.pdf/$file/amchem.pdf; Emery G. 
Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, The Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act on the Federal Courts: An 
Empirical Analysis of Filings and Removals, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1723 (2008); Thomas E. Willging et 
al., An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 to Address the Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74 
(1996). 
113 Perhaps the most studied subcategory of class actions relates to plaintiffs’ civil rights and 
employment discrimination cases, which scholars for decades have been arguing constitute a universe 
of class actions that are more frequently dismissed on summary judgment motions, denied class 
certification, or otherwise dismissed. See, e.g., Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimination Class 
Actions Survive?, 37 AKRON L. REV. 813 (2004). 
114 Cf. Lee & Willging, supra note 112, at 1750. 
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actions and all other types of class litigation. Instead, what the post-PSLRA 
and CAFA eras demonstrate is the continued resiliency of the plaintiffs’ 
class action bar and its ability to regroup and adapt. 
Commentators have also noted that one of the many ironies of the 
PSLRA was that it led to more securities class litigation rather than less.115 
Thus, in spite of heightened pleading requirements, more stringent 
substantive standards, and a change in the designated class representative, 
securities class attorneys have nonetheless discovered ways to satisfy these 
new requirements. Thus, securities class litigation flourished even after the 
PSLRA.116 
And similar to the post-PSLRA record, CAFA has failed to “kill off” 
class litigation. Instead, class action defendants have utilized CAFA to 
remove as many state class actions to federal court as possible under the 
new CAFA removal provision.117 The Federal Judicial Center has 
documented—not surprisingly—a spiked increase in removal practice after 
CAFA.118 Thus, CAFA has not reduced class litigation; it has merely 
redistributed the forums where class litigation is adjudicated and 
resolved.119 Nor is there substantial evidence that the removal of class 
litigation to federal court has resulted in increased denials of class 
certification or dismissals of class actions. 
3. The Supreme Court Saves the Class Action!: Shady Grove 
Orthopedics.—If ever the Supreme Court had an opportunity to 
kill off federal class actions, it came in the 2010 case Shady Grove 
Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.120 Notwithstanding 
 
115 See Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 913, 913 (“The picture that emerges from studying these data is that the PSLRA did not work as 
intended. This article demonstrates that as many, if not more, class actions are filed after the Act as 
before.”). 
116 See John C. Coffee Jr. & Stefan Paulovic, Class Certification: Developments over the Last Five 
Years 2002‒2007, 8 Class Action Litig. Rep. (BNA), at S-787 to S-789 (Oct. 26, 2007). 
117 And, as indicated above, the plaintiffs’ bar also has learned how to plead around the CAFA 
jurisdictional and removal provisions in order to keep some class actions in the state forums where they 
are originally filed. Cf. Lee & Willging, supra note 112, at 1756. 
118 See id. at 1750‒54 & fig.1. It also is difficult to estimate whether some plaintiffs’ attorneys, 
confronted with the inevitable possibility of a CAFA removal, have now simply opted to originally file 
their class actions in federal court. If this is true, CAFA will have had the unintended consequence of 
increasing class litigation in federal courts. See id. at 1751‒53; cf. Coffee & Paulovic, supra note 116, 
at S-789 to S-790 (“Recognizing that their class actions could be removed from state courts under 
CAFA, plaintiff’s attorneys may instead file class actions initially in ‘friendly’ jurisdictions, such as the 
Second and Ninth, rather than see them removed to ‘unfriendly’ federal courts in the Fourth and Fifth 
Circuits.”). 
119 There is little empirical proof for the proposition that class action litigation has decreased or 
increased comparative to other eras. The CAFA analogy here is to the pig working its way through the 
python’s digestive track. Thus, class litigation has just moved along to another place. 
120 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010). 
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dire prognostications to the contrary,121 the Supreme Court confounded 
Court watchers by rescuing the federal class action rule in a 
semicomprehensible array of opinions with Justices joining and concurring 
in various parts.122 No matter. Rule 23 was saved. 
The collision between federal and state class action practice in Shady 
Grove arose from a New York state civil code provision that prohibits 
plaintiffs from pursuing a class action to recover statutory penalties or 
minimal recoveries.123 In the underlying litigation, the plaintiff filed a class 
action in a New York federal court to recover a 2% monthly late-payment 
fee, on behalf of all class members, from the defendant.124 The lower courts 
invoked the code provision, dismissing the class action.125 The Supreme 
Court was asked to decide whether Rule 23, which contains no such 
prohibition on penalty fee cases, applied or whether the lower federal 
courts were correct in dismissing the lawsuit based on New York state law. 
The Court’s resolution of this Erie dispute was significant for litigants 
potentially involved in class action litigation. If the Court affirmed the 
lower courts’ dismissals, other states potentially would have followed New 
York’s example and sought to impose similar statutory limitations on the 
class action mechanism. At the extreme, states might have chosen to ban 
class actions altogether, as Virginia and Mississippi currently do in their 
state courts.126 And similar state statutes limiting the remedies or claims for 
certain types of class actions would have become enforceable in federal 
 
121 I readily admit to being among the dire (and subsequently very surprised) prognosticators, 
especially after hearing the arguments before the Court. 
122 For a description and attempted analysis through this messy swamp of jurisprudence, see Linda 
S. Mullenix, Federal Class Actions: A Near-Death Experience in a Shady Grove, 79 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 448 (2011), shamelessly exploiting the prevailing class action “death” metaphor. 
123 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) (McKinney 2006) (“Unless a statute creating or imposing a penalty, or a 
minimum measure of recovery specifically authorizes the recovery thereof in a class action, an action to 
recover a penalty, or minimum measure of recovery created or imposed by statute may not be 
maintained as a class action.”). 
124 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 466 F. Supp. 2d 467, 469 (E.D.N.Y. 
2006), aff’d, 549 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010). 
125 See, e.g., Shady Grove, 549 F.3d at 146. 
126 Currently, Mississippi and Virginia do not have state class action rules, although this is not a 
matter of statutory enactment banning class actions. See Wade v. Danek Med., Inc., 182 F.3d 281, 287 
n.7 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that Virginia does not use a class action mechanism); Janssen 
Pharmaceutica, Inc. v. Armond, 866 So. 2d 1092, 1102 (Miss. 2004) (Graves, J., specially concurring) 
(stating that Mississippi does not use a class action mechanism and in fact has no statutory or common 
law provision allowing class actions); see also Linda S. Mullenix, Should Mississippi Adopt a Class-
Action Rule―Balancing the Equities: Ten Considerations that Mississippi Rulemakers Ought to Take 
into Account in Evaluating Whether to Adopt a State Class-Action Rule, 24 MISS. C. L. REV. 217, 217 
& n.2 (2005) (noting that Mississippi is the only state in the Union that allows no class actions, whereas 
Virginia, lacking a class action rule, nonetheless allows class relief in some situations). See generally 
Deborah J. Challener, Foreword: Love It or Leave It; An Examination of the Need for and Structure of 
a Class Action Rule in Mississippi, 24 MISS. C. L. REV. 145 (2005) (discussing how Mississippi does 
not have a class action rule and advocating for one). 
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court, resulting in dismissals of class actions based on state law 
limitations.127 Under such a precedent, these state limitations effectively 
would have curbed or eliminated class action practice in both state and 
federal courts. 
But instead the Court decided that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 
takes precedence in federal diversity class actions and preempted state 
statutory provisions that limit class litigation. There was no majority 
opinion. A slim plurality saved the federal class action from death by a 
thousand cuts through state-limiting provisions on class litigation, although 
the Justices recognized that their decision will encourage class action 
federal forum shopping to evade states with existing statutory limits on 
class litigation.128 Justice Ginsburg noted the irony inherent in the Court’s 
decision, which undermined congressional intent in enacting CAFA129 
while saving the federal class action.130 As a matter of Erie jurisprudence, 
the Court splintered and muddied the already murky swamp of the Erie 
doctrine. 
4. The Supreme Court Saves the Class Action Again!: Those Other 
Overlooked 2011 Decisions.—If the Supreme Court had wanted to 
kill off class action litigation, it actually had four opportunities to do so 
during its 2010 to 2011 term. Instead, it did not. Often lost in the public 
outcry over the Court’s decisions in Wal-Mart and Concepcion, the Court 
decided two other important class action cases that term, and both these 
decisions favored plaintiffs and disadvantaged class action defendants. 
a. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co.—Unlike the Wal-
Mart and Concepcion cases, the Erica P. John Fund, Inc.131 decision 
clearly represented a victory for class action plaintiffs involved in securities 
litigation. A unanimous Court rejected Halliburton’s invitation to tighten a 
securities class action plaintiff’s burden of proof at class certification.132 
Just as corporate America must have breathed a sigh of relief in the Court’s 
Wal-Mart and Concepcion decisions, so too must the plaintiffs’ securities 
class action bar have been relieved at the Court’s decision in EPJ Fund. 
 
127 See Brief for Respondent at apps. A‒B, Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. 1431 (No. 08-1008), 2009 WL 
2777648, at *1a–14aa (listing representative federal and state statutes limiting the remedy available in a 
class action as well as representative state statutes prohibiting class actions for particular claims). 
128 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1435, 1448. 
129 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections 
of 28 U.S.C.). 
130 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1473 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Similarly ironic is the fact that many 
such class actions would not be allowed in the courts of the states under whose laws the causes of action 
arise. See id. 
131 Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011). 
132 See id. at 2183, 2187. 
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b. Smith v. Bayer Corp.—In perhaps the most obscure of the 
four cases dealing with class action litigation, the Court in Smith v. Bayer 
Corp.133 essentially permitted a duplicative class action to proceed to class 
certification in a West Virginia state court after a Minnesota federal court 
had denied class certification in an identical class action. To make a long 
story short, first, a federal district court denied class certification; then, a 
different plaintiff brought an identical class action in West Virginia state 
court. Next, the defendant asked the federal court to enjoin the class 
certification hearing in the state court under the relitigation exception to the 
Anti-Injunction Act (which, generally speaking, prohibits federal courts 
from enjoining state ones);134 the federal court entered the injunction but 
was ultimately reversed when the Supreme Court decided that the Anti-
Injunction Act exception didn’t allow the injunction and, perhaps more 
significantly, that a decision denying class certification cannot, consistently 
with the due process protection against nonparty preclusion, bind and thus 
prevent other members of that alleged class from trying class certification 
themselves.135 In other words, each member of the class can take a crack at 
filing a case and seeking class status. 
II. FROM RULE 23 AND CLASS ACTIONS TO AGGREGATE LITIGATION: THE 
DEATH OF CLASS ACTIONS (II) 
It is fair to contend, then, that Feinberg’s pronouncement is an 
inaccurate assessment of judicial and legislative trends. As described 
above, there is plentiful evidence that class actions are alive, well, and 
flourishing. Thus, current pronouncements of the death of class action are 
misguided, even though historically predictable. 
However, although class litigation continues unabated in federal and 
state courts, it is fair to suggest that the quality and nature of class litigation 
has changed over time. There has been a sea change in the ways in which 
litigants, their attorneys, courts, and extrajudicial dispute resolution 
mechanisms approach class action litigation. Perhaps the most telling 
signifier of this trend is the drift away from the clearly defined concept of 
the “class action” to the more vague and amorphous concept of “aggregate 
litigation.”136 
The change in nomenclature is important. The idea of class action 
litigation carried with it a defined Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (Rule 
23), important constitutional underpinnings, seventy-plus years of litigation 
experience, and an enormous corpus of jurisprudence. However conflicted 
and ambiguous this class action jurisprudence, class litigation was and still 
 
133 131 S. Ct. 2368 (2011). 
134 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2006). 
135 See Smith, 131 S. Ct. at 2373. 
136 See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION (2010). 
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is governed by a set of constitutional, statutory, and rules-based principles. 
The embrace by various actors in the judicial and political arenas of 
aggregate litigation, in contrast, represents the triumph of a more 
amorphous form of dispute resolution. As will be argued, the advent of the 
era of aggregate litigation has signaled a move away from the rule of law 
into more dangerous territory of arbitrary justice. 
A number of theories suggest reasons for this drift from class action 
litigation to the more pliable concept of aggregate litigation. One reason is 
enhanced freedom of action. Once untethered from the class action rule and 
class action jurisprudence, litigants are afforded enhanced flexibility to do 
whatever they want in resolving massive disputes. The desirability of free-
form aggregate dispute resolution has always had great appeal for the 
plaintiffs’ side of the docket, but over time the defense bar similarly came 
to understand the attractiveness of the ability to resolve its major litigation 
free from the constraints of the class action rule. Furthermore, federal 
courts likewise embraced the notion that they could clear their dockets of 
major litigation by acceding to new forms of dispute resolution, unmoored 
from the jurisprudential constraints of the class action rule. 
This tectonic shift away from conventional class action litigation, it 
will be argued, has been manifested in four different ways, each 
noteworthy because it signals a trend towards more undemocratic dispute 
resolution. These include (1) the increasing use of the settlement class, 
(2) the nonclass contractual aggregate settlement, (3) the quasi-class action, 
and (4) fund approaches to aggregate claims resolution. 
If the primary justice concern should focus on the fair and equitable 
resolution of individual claims, then the new means for aggregate dispute 
resolution, accomplished outside the protection of established class 
litigation, is a disquieting development. Moreover, as stated at the outset of 
this Article, much of Professor Redish’s work has been devoted to arguing 
about the undemocratic features of class litigation. If Redish is correct, then 
his arguments, rather than being irrelevant, apply with even greater force to 
aggregate dispute resolution mechanisms that fail to supply even the 
protections of the class action rule. 
A. The Triumph of MDL Procedure and Settlement Classes 
Through the end of the twentieth century, class litigation followed a 
fairly well-defined procedural course: attorneys filed a class action 
complaint, certification proceedings ensued, the court granted or denied 
class certification, and class litigation or a settlement resulted. Throughout 
this process, however, class litigation was largely supervised and managed 
by a judicial officer protecting the interests of absent class members. 
In the early 1990s, during the heyday of mass tort litigation, plaintiffs’ 
attorneys introduced the largely then-unknown technique of the “settlement 
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class.”137 This involved parties to a class action first negotiating a 
settlement and then filing a complaint with a request for certification of the 
class and approval of the settlement. Throughout the 1990s, the major class 
action debate focused on the legitimacy of the settlement class,138 and a 
chief concern focused on the adequacy of representation of absent class 
members as well as other ethical considerations related to crafting and 
approving a class settlement in this manner. The Supreme Court 
definitively decided this debate—in favor of the settlement class—in its 
Amchem and Ortiz decisions. 
The Supreme Court in Amchem and Ortiz validated the concept of the 
settlement class, indicating, though, that settlement classes had to satisfy all 
the requirements for class certification as litigation classes, except for the 
manageability requirement for Rule 23(b)(3) classes.139 The Court’s twin 
settlement class decisions inspired litigators in the ensuing decade to 
embrace the concept of the settlement class with enthusiasm. 
In the twenty-first century, newfound enthusiasm for the settlement 
class was coupled with a newfound enthusiasm for multidistrict 
proceedings.140 Until the early 1990s, federal courts had consistently 
resisted and repudiated attempts to use Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) 
auspices to create mass tort and other class action multidistrict litigation.141 
In 1991, however, an MDL panel reversed this trend when the panel 
approved and created an asbestos MDL.142 In the ensuing two decades, 
 
137 The most famous (or infamous) settlement class in this period was Georgine v. Amchem 
Products, Inc., in which a settlement class was certified by Judge Reed in the Federal District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. See 157 F.R.D. 246, 315 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (approving a settlement 
class). This nationwide settlement class of current and future asbestos claimants was intended to resolve 
all outstanding asbestos claims. The Third Circuit overturned the approval of this settlement class in 
1995, see Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 618 (3d Cir. 1996), and eventually the U.S. 
Supreme Court upheld the Third Circuit’s decision in its 1997 Amchem decision. See Amchem Prods., 
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597 (1997). 
138 The best appellate discussion of the problems relating to the legitimacy of settlement classes in 
this period may be found in Judge Becker’s decisions in the GMC Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Products 
Liability Litigation and his reprise of this debate one year later in Georgine. See In re Gen. Motors 
Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 786‒94 (3d Cir. 1995); Georgine, 83 
F.3d at 634‒35. 
139 See, e.g., Amchem, 521 U.S. at 619‒20. 
140 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006). The multidistrict litigation statute is essentially a transfer 
provision that permits the transfer of all pending cases that share a common question of law or fact to 
one designated federal court for coordinated pretrial proceedings. For the paradigm shift to increased 
use of MDL proceedings after Amchem and Ortiz, see generally Edward F. Sherman, The MDL Model 
for Resolving Complex Litigation If a Class Action Is Not Possible, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2205 (2008); 
Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to Multidistrict Consolidations: 
Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 775 (2010). 
141 See MULLENIX, supra note 42, at 2. 
142 In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., 771 F. Supp. 415, 417 (J.P.M.L. 1991). 
107:511 (2013) The Death of Democratic Dispute Resolution 
539 
MDL panels created dozens of new multidistrict mass tort,143 consumer, 
and other aggregate litigations.144 Moreover, no longer does the MDL panel 
wait for litigants to request creation of an MDL for particular aggregate 
cases; instead, the MDL panel frequently sua sponte, or at the request of a 
federal judge or judges, creates an MDL.145 Indeed, almost all new 
pharmaceutical, medical device, and consumer actions almost immediately 
become subject to MDL jurisdiction. 
This proliferation of MDL proceedings has been married to the 
settlement class device. The marriage of MDL proceedings to the 
settlement class has modified usual class litigation by providing a judicial 
platform that is largely free from initial or ongoing class action constraints. 
In this setting, attorneys representing thousands or hundreds of thousands 
of claimants are at liberty to bargain and negotiate aggregate claims and 
then to cobble together a class settlement with defendants to be presented 
to the MDL judge. At this juncture, MDL judges, motivated by the inertial 
pressures to clear dockets of massive litigation, routinely bless the 
settlements. Nonetheless, the harnessing of the settlement class device to 
MDL jurisdiction resonates in back-room deal making, blanketed with an 
aura of judicial legitimacy and largely liberated from the due process 
concerns and protections associated with the class action itself. 
B. The Contractual Nonclass Aggregate Settlement Movement 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the drift towards 
resolving aggregate litigation through MDL settlement classes went largely 
unnoticed, most likely because such complex litigation was being resolved 
through existing and familiar procedural means. What had changed by then 
was a marked shift in judicial attitudes and receptivity to employing the 
MDL mechanism combined with the settlement class to dispose of complex 
litigation. 
The combined MDL and settlement class model, however, proved to 
be a somewhat imperfect vessel for resolving massive cases, at least for the 
attorneys involved. Although MDL forums and agreeable MDL judges 
provided a more hospitable environment for free-wheeling dispute 
resolution, in the end, any class settlement the parties negotiated and agreed 
to was still subject to Rule 23(e)’s scrutiny when the parties presented their 
 
143 See Willging & Lee, supra note 140, at 793–98 (addressing the rising number of mass tort, 
product liability, and medical device MDL proceedings). 
144 See Pending MDLs, U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., http://www.jpml.uscourts.
gov/pending-mdls-0 (last visited Mar. 21, 2013); see also Multidistrict Litigation Terminated Through 
September 30, 2012, U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/
sites/jpml/files/JPML_Terminated_Litigations-2012.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2013) (listing all MDL 
proceedings resolved through September 30, 2012). 
145 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(c)(i) (providing the panel the authority to create MDLs on its own 
initiative). 
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deal to the MDL court.146 Even in an MDL, a class settlement still needs 
judicial approval at a “fairness hearing” at which interested parties can 
raise objections based on dozens of years’ worth of class action 
jurisprudence. 
Against this backdrop, the interests of plaintiffs’ counsel and defense 
counsel converged. Both sought to exploit the favorable MDL environment 
to forge favorable deals, resolving massive liabilities. The aim, thus, was to 
create some deal-making mechanism that could simultaneously take 
advantage of the MDL forum but liberate ultimate deal approval from the 
threat of irksome objectors seeking to derail accomplished arrangements, as 
well as liberate parties from the constraints of the irksome requirements of 
the class action rule.147 
Enter the contractual nonclass aggregate settlement. Plaintiffs’ and 
defense attorneys initially deployed the concept of the contractual 
aggregate nonclass settlement in pharmaceutical mass tort litigation, most 
famously in resolution of the massive Vioxx litigation.148 The mechanism of 
the contractual aggregate nonclass settlement has since been used 
repeatedly in other pharmaceutical and mass tort litigation, including the 
Zyprexa litigation149 and other cases.150 
The concept behind the contractual aggregate nonclass settlement is 
simple. Individual cases that are scattered throughout the federal system are 
collected and transferred to a single MDL forum. In current practice, 
parties often need not wait through months of extensive MDL petitions and 
hearings because contemporary MDL panels obligingly and 
instantaneously create MDLs for emerging massive cases.151 
 
146 See FED R. CIV. P. 23(e); FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 
§§ 21.61‒.612, at 308‒15 (4th ed. 2004) (describing standards for judicial approval of settlement 
classes and the role of the judge in approving settlements). 
147 The emergence of nonclass settlement arrangements has generated significant commentary, 
much of it focusing on problems relating to the implementation and legitimacy of nonclass settlements. 
See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, CAFA’s Impact on Litigation as a Public Good, 29 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2517 (2008); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Group Consensus, Individual Consent, 79 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 506 (2011); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Procedural Justice in Nonclass Aggregation, 44 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1 (2009); Howard M. Erichson, CAFA’s Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1593 (2008); Howard M. Erichson, The Trouble with All-or-Nothing Settlements, 58 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 979 (2010); Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL 
L. REV. 265 (2011); Judith Resnik, Compared to What?: ALI Aggregation and the Shifting Contours of 
Due Process and of Lawyers’ Powers, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 628 (2011). 
148 See Vioxx Settlement Update, OFFICIAL VIOXX SETTLEMENT, http://www.officialvioxx
settlement.com (last visited Mar. 21, 2013) (providing links to documents with information about the 
litigation). Note that this website is sponsored by the Vioxx MDL Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee. 
149 In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 490 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
150 See Willging & Lee, supra note 140, at 793‒802. 
151 See id. at 793–94. It should also be noted that savvy and knowledgeable complex litigation 
practitioners lobby assiduously before MDL panels to have their cases assigned to known 
accommodating MDL judges who will both sign off on accomplished deals and agree to the award of 
sizeable attorney fees. 
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Once under the umbrella of an MDL court, the parties involved in the 
litigation forge an agreeable deal, which more often than not embraces a 
highly favorable, discounted arrangement for the defendant in exchange for 
sizeable fees for the plaintiffs’ attorneys. However, rather than creating a 
class action settlement, the parties instead create a contractual arrangement 
that applies to all individual claims. This contractual settlement of massive 
claims thus concludes all outstanding litigation but nonetheless evades 
class action approval or scrutiny. The parties then present their contractual 
deal to the MDL judge who, upon concluding that the parties have 
amicably arranged a contract, dismisses the litigation. 
The attorneys on both sides of the docket who have crafted the concept 
of the contractual aggregate nonclass settlement are to be commended for 
their inventiveness. In essence, complex litigation attorneys—as interested 
actors—have crafted a dispute resolution mechanism that favors their own 
interests often at the expense of unknowing claimants whom the attorneys 
purportedly represent. Once attorneys on both sides of the docket became 
comfortable with the shift of complex litigation into MDL forums, the 
parties involved created a much better mousetrap. Without much notice, 
fanfare, or objection, the attorneys involved in aggregate litigation devised 
a means for disposing of large-scale litigation unburdened by exacting 
judicial scrutiny or jurisprudential constraints conferred by the class action 
rule. The shift to contractual aggregate nonclass settlement has been 
gradual, evolutionary, and subtle, building on existing procedural 
mechanisms and cleverly mimicking known procedural memes (such as the 
class action). 
As indicated above, nomenclature is important. The “nonclass 
aggregate contractual settlement” is a concept that deliberately resonates in 
the familiar language of the class action while simultaneously rejecting the 
class concept in favor of a unit of “aggregate claims” resolved instead by 
contract. It should come as no surprise, also, that the attorneys on both 
sides of the dockets who were engaged in creating the nonclass aggregate 
contractual settlement device lobbied to institutionalize these practices 
through the auspices of the American Law Institute.152 
C. The Invention of the Quasi-Class Action 
Although the attorney-driven creation of the contractual nonclass 
aggregate settlement mechanism marks a new benchmark in dispute 
resolution, it does not represent the end point of evolutionary drift in 
complex dispute resolution. Once MDL judges embarked into the new 
conceptual world of contractual nonclass aggregate settlements, it was only 
 
152 See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., supra note 136, § 3.01, at 187‒88. 
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a matter of time before judicial invention of the “quasi-class action.”153 
Indeed, the quasi-class action may almost be viewed as the logical 
extension of, and corollary to, the contractual nonclass aggregate 
settlement.154 
Judge Jack Weinstein invented the quasi-class action in his judicial 
management of the Zyprexa litigation.155 The core issue that prompted 
Judge Weinstein to invoke the concept of the quasi-class action focused on 
an attorney fee dispute. In class action litigation, attorney fees are subject 
to judicial scrutiny and approval.156 Although there are different 
methodologies for determining attorney fees in class action litigation,157 the 
most common method calculates fees based on a percentage of the 
common-benefit fund that the attorneys negotiate on behalf of the class 
claimants.158 
The Zyprexa litigation, however, was not resolved as a class action 
settlement and therefore theoretically was not subject to any class action 
constraints, such as judicial review of the attorney fee requests. 
Consequently, some plaintiffs’ attorneys sought to enforce privately 
negotiated contingent fee contracts, which would have provided attorney 
fees in excess of those typically awarded in common-benefit class 
litigation. 
Judge Weinstein apparently believed these privately negotiated fee 
contracts would reward excessive fees to the attorneys and were unfair to 
claimants. In order to block enforcement of the contingent fee contracts, 
Judge Weinstein requested that the special masters assisting him in the 
Zyprexa litigation adjust the requested attorney fee schedules.159 In issuing 
 
153 See Linda S. Mullenix, Dubious Doctrines: The Quasi-Class Action, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 389 
(2011). Portions of this section of the Article are adapted from this piece, which examines the origins of 
the quasi-class action. 
154 See Fla. Power Corp. v. Granlund, 82 F.R.D. 690, 692 (M.D. Fla. 1979), noting, about the 
invocation of a quasi-class action: “The Court is faced here with a procedural invention of unknown 
origin which bears a remarkable resemblance to the class action . . . and which has itself engendered 
considerable controversy in the context of this case.” 
155 See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 122, 122 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (the first of a series 
of Zyprexa orders invoking the concept of the quasi-class action). The Zyprexa litigation was not the 
first case in which Judge Weinstein used the term quasi-class action, nor was it the last. However, the 
Zyprexa litigation is significant in that it spawned no fewer than thirty-two separate orders in which 
Judge Weinstein repeated that he conducted the Zyprexa litigation as a quasi-class action. 
156 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h). 
157 See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 146, § 21.7, at 334‒35. 
158 See id. § 14.121, at 186‒93. The other common method for determining attorney fees in class 
litigation is the lodestar method, which requires plaintiffs’ attorneys to keep detailed billing records of 
time expended in the representation as well as detailed records of other fees and expenses. The court 
then adjusts actual billing fees by a lodestar, which effectively is a multiplier to account for assumption 
of risk, lost opportunity costs, and similar factors in pursuing class litigation on behalf of claimants. Id. 
§ 14.122, at 193‒96. 
159 In re Zyprexa, 233 F.R.D. at 122 (instructing special masters to “consider a fee that shall be the 
lesser of the maximum reasonable general fee schedule they recommend, the fee agreed upon between 
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this order, Judge Weinstein declared that the Zyprexa litigation had been 
administered as a quasi-class action, which theoretically provided Judge 
Weinstein with the authority to adjust attorney fees.160 
Judge Weinstein, in one of his earliest Zyprexa decisions, described 
the central features of a quasi-class action. Quasi-class actions, then, occur 
under the umbrella of MDL proceedings. Within the MDL auspice, a quasi-
class action is characterized by: 
The large number of plaintiffs subject to the same settlement matrix approved 
by the court, the utilization of special masters approved by the court to control 
discovery and assist in and administer settlement, and the order of the court 
for a huge escrow arrangement and other interventions by the court reflect a 
degree of control requiring exercise by the court of fiduciary standards to 
ensure fair treatment to all parties and counsel regarding fees.161 
Even though the quasi-class action had its origins in the Zyprexa 
attorney fee dispute, the concept gained traction in no small part because 
Judge Weinstein repeatedly used the label in numerous subsequent 
published opinions and orders. Thus, in the aftermath of Weinstein’s 
original announcement that the Zyprexa litigation was administered as a 
quasi-class action, Judge Weinstein issued no fewer than thirty-one 
additional orders reasserting that the Zyprexa litigation was a quasi-class 
action. 
However, few of these opinions discuss what a quasi-class action is, 
the consequences of characterizing litigation as a quasi-class action, or 
authority in support of this concept. Instead, Judge Weinstein’s orders 
dramatically illustrate the problem of computer-generated boilerplate 
opinions that repeat formulaic, conclusory set pieces. Hence, in at least 
twenty-five of his thirty-one Zyprexa decisions, Judge Weinstein copied 
and pasted the identical paragraph referring to the quasi-class action.162 
 
the client and the attorney in an individual case, and the maximum amount permitted under the 
applicable local state rules or statutes”); see also In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 04-MD-1596, 
2008 WL 2511791, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 19, 2008) (describing fee adjustments). 
160 In re Zyprexa, 233 F.R.D. at 122. 
161 Id. at 122‒23; see also In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 238 F.R.D. 539, 540 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(reiterating the judge’s conclusion that an obligation existed to exercise control over the proceedings 
and adjust fees); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 490 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(describing the same). 
162 See, e.g., In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 04-MD-1596, 06-CV-2592, 2009 WL 
5062109, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2009) (order concerning Arizona’s two-year statute of limitations on 
consumer products liability claims). The order states: 
 The individual Zyprexa user litigation has been administered as a quasi-class action. See In re 
Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 467 F. Supp. 2d 256, 262 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (“The court, magistrate 
judge and special masters will continue to administer this litigation as a quasi-class action.”); In re 
Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 451 F. Supp. 2d 458, 477 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Recognizing its 
obligation to exercise careful oversight of this national ‘quasi-class action,’ the court has already 
utilized its equitable power to limit attorneys’ fees and costs.”) (citation omitted); In re Zyprexa 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d 268, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding that individual Zyprexa 
user litigation “may be characterized properly as a quasi-class action subject to the general 
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Only a very small subset of Judge Weinstein’s Zyprexa orders 
attempted to amplify a theory of the quasi-class action as it related to the 
attorney fee issue.163 And to further demonstrate the doctrinal drift away 
from conventional class litigation under Rule 23 to some other construct, 
Judge Weinstein referred to the Zyprexa litigation variously as a “non-class 
action conglomerate settlement,”164 something analogous to the class 
action,165 and a “structural class action.”166 Yet Judge Weinstein 
acknowledged that the resolution of the Zyprexa litigation was “in the 
nature of a private agreement between individual plaintiffs and 
defendants.”167 
In a half-dozen orders, Judge Weinstein cited various authoritative 
sources in support of his ability to supervise the award of attorney fees in 
the context of a private-party settlement based on his theory that he was 
supervising a quasi-class action. Judge Weinstein briefly cited four types of 
authority: (1) the “general equitable powers of the court,” (2) the Federal 
 
equitable power of the court”); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 491 
(E.D.N.Y. 2006) (same); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 122, 122 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(same). 
In re Zyprexa, 2009 WL 5062109, at *1. 
 Clearly, this repeated reference to the quasi-class action is self-referential and provides no doctrinal 
support for the concept. Moreover, in the numerous orders in which Judge Weinstein recites that 
Zyprexa was administered as a quasi-class action, that status had absolutely no implication at all for the 
issue adjudicated in the order. See id. at *16 (granting a motion to dismiss on statute of limitations 
grounds); see also In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 260 F.R.D. 13, 17‒18, 25 app. B (E.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(holding, along with a boilerplate recitation of quasi-class action status, that the magistrate’s discovery 
order in the state attorneys’ general litigation was not clearly erroneous and that the MDL settlement 
was warranted); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 04-MD-1596, 2009 WL 1173069, at *1, app. B 
at *6‒7 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2009) (ordering the expanded authority of the special master to include the 
attorneys general of Idaho and Minnesota, along with a boilerplate recitation of quasi-class action 
status); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 253 F.R.D. 69, 78‒79, 82 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (granting class 
certification to institutions and patients against a pharmaceuticals manufacturer alleging overpayment 
on purchases of Zyprexa, and again providing a boilerplate recitation of quasi-class action status); In re 
Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 04-MD-1596, 05-CV-4115, 2008 WL 2696916, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 
2, 2008) (providing a boilerplate recitation of a quasi-class action status order in preparation for a 
conference on a motion for class action status in third-party payor litigation); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 451 F. Supp. 2d 458, 477‒79 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (referring to quasi-class action status as the basis 
for limiting attorney fees and ordering that state Medicaid agencies pay their share of attorney fees and 
costs in procuring settlement). 
163 See, e.g., In re Zyprexa, 238 F.R.D. at 540‒41; In re Zyprexa, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 269‒73; In re 
Zyprexa, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 271‒72; In re Zyprexa, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 491‒93; In re Zyprexa, 233 
F.R.D. at 122‒23; see also In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 2d 397, 403‒04 (E.D.N.Y. 
2009) (discussing the court’s equitable power to adjust attorney’s fees). 
164 In re Zyprexa, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 262; see also id. at 269 (referring to the Zyprexa settlement as 
a “conglomerate mass quasi-class action . . . in the offing”). 
165 In re Zyprexa, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 491‒92. 
166 In re Zyprexa, 671 F. Supp. 2d at 433 (emphasis added) (“Mississippi’s suit is in the nature of a 
structural class action. The extensive case law regarding the uses and limitations of aggregate evidence 
in Rule 23 class actions is applicable.”). The suit was not pursued formally under Rule 23. 
167 In re Zyprexa, 233 F.R.D. at 122. 
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Rules of Civil Procedure, (3) precedential cases, and (4) the Class Action 
Fairness Act. However, none of these briefly referenced authorities in 
Judge Weinstein’s various Zyprexa orders remotely authorized or 
legitimized the concept of the quasi-class action. In addition, Judge 
Weinstein also appealed to various broad policy rationales to justify his 
endorsement of the quasi-class action mechanism.168 
Judge Weinstein’s broadest invocation of authority for the quasi-class 
action was the “general equitable power of the court.”169 Under the rubric 
of the “general equitable powers of the court,” Weinstein located a mandate 
to federal judges to creatively innovate in the supervision and 
administration of aggregate litigation. Relying on no less an authoritative 
body than the FJC, in a daisy chain of logic, Weinstein suggested: 
Recognizing the special difficulties presented by mass tort quasi-class actions, 
the Federal Judicial Center has advised that “[a]lthough the ‘just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action’ requirement applies to all cases, 
the difficult and sometimes contradictory demands posed by mass torts make 
case management both challenging and critical. The absence of precedent or 
of legislative or rule-making solutions should not foreclose innovation and 
creativity.”170 
Relying, then, on the FJC’s Manual for Complex Litigation to supply 
content to the court’s inherent power, Judge Weinstein concluded that 
“when confronting the novel challenges of aggregate litigation,” individual 
courts and judges are obligated to rely on the innovation and creativity 
allowed by their inherent equitable power.171 However, his references to the 
Manual for Complex Litigation as directly or indirectly supporting the 
quasi-class action seems dubious at best; the Manual does not articulate, 
propose, endorse, or recognize the quasi-class action anywhere in its 
hundreds of pages. 
Judge Weinstein’s second cluster of support for the quasi-class action 
is derived from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Ironically, many of 
the authorities he cites rely on the class action rule itself: Rule 23(g), (h), 
and (e).172 But Rule 23 and the Advisory Committee note nowhere speak of 
the concept of a quasi-class action, and Rule 23 does not by its terms 
 
168 See discussion infra note 182 and accompanying text. 
169 See, e.g., In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d 268, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
170 Id. (quoting FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 146, § 22.1 (alteration in original)). 
171 Id. Judge Weinstein also cited to the AM. LAW INST., COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT app. B, 
§ 6 cmt. c, at 818 (Council Draft No. 4, Oct. 23, 1992). 
172 See, e.g., In re Zyprexa, 233 F.R.D. at 122. Judge Weinstein cited Rule 23(g)(1)(C)(iii) (judicial 
authority in appointing counsel to consider alternative possible fee proposals by competing applicants 
for appointment as class counsel), Rule 23(h) (judicial authority to approve fee petitions in class 
actions), and Rule 23(e)(1)‒(2) (dealing with judicial approval of proposed class action settlements). 
See also In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 491 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing Rule 23 
provisions in support of a quasi-class action). 
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provide support for broad assertions of judicial power in aggregate 
settlements outside the context of a certified class action. Again, something 
either is a class action under Rule 23 or it is not; a “conglomeration” is not 
a class action or even something analogous to a class action, except, 
perhaps, in its size. 
In addition to citing Rule 23 as authority in support of the quasi-class 
action, Judge Weinstein also cited Rule 1, which mandates that federal 
courts should administer the rules to accomplish the “just . . . determination 
of every action.”173 However, the global asbestos class settlements in 
Amchem and Ortiz—both accomplished under the formal requirements of 
Rule 23 and subsequently repudiated by the Supreme Court—were not 
therefore legitimized by Rule 1 simply because the settlements 
accomplished an efficient resolution of all asbestos claims. 
The third type of authority that Judge Weinstein broadly cited was 
precedent, including two class actions that he presided over: the New York 
asbestos litigation174 and the Agent Orange settlement.175 Yet both of these 
cases are dubious support for the theory that a quasi-class action is a 
legitimate construct because both were pursued under the formal class 
action rule, and the New York asbestos litigation was ultimately resolved 
under bankruptcy auspices. These cases represent the proposition that 
judges in properly certified class actions may approve or disapprove 
attorney fee requests, but neither has anything to do with the quasi-class 
action. 
Finally, Judge Weinstein cited CAFA176 as providing additional 
support for the quasi-class action.177 He referred specifically to a CAFA 
subsection authorizing the removal of “mass” actions to federal court.178 
However, this CAFA provision has nothing to do with quasi-class actions. 
Of the fifty states, two do not have state class action rules.179 Consequently, 
actions instituted in those states that join large numbers of plaintiffs would 
 
173 See In re Zyprexa, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 491 (alteration in original) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1). 
174 Id. (citing In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 784 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991)). 
175 Id. (citing In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1296, 1304–05 (E.D.N.Y. 
1985)). 
176 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2006), as amended by the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. 
No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, 9. 
177 In re Zyprexa, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 491. 
178 Id. (citing § 1332(d)(11)(A)). 
179 These states are Mississippi and Virginia. See discussion supra note 126. Mississippi, at least, 
permits simple joinder of large numbers of plaintiffs in a single action but does not recognize the class 
action mechanism. Cf. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 2d 397, 402 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(characterizing Mississippi’s individual lawsuit in the Zyprexa litigation, seeking approval for use of 
class-wide statistical aggregate evidence, as constituting “a ‘structural’ class action . . . congruent with 
other forms of aggregate litigation insofar as the State [sought] to use generalized evidence to prove its 
claims”). 
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not be subject to removal under CAFA.180 To remedy this problem, 
Congress enacted a provision to provide defendants sued in these states the 
ability to remove cases involving the mass joinder of claimants and called 
these types of cases “mass actions.”181 In so doing, Congress did not 
contemplate, create, or endorse the concept of a quasi-class action. 
In addition to the weak rule-based and precedential authority that 
Judge Weinstein conjured for his assertion of judicial power outside the 
confines of an appropriately constituted class action, he relied on dicta and 
policy rationales. For example, he cited with disapproval the history of 
mass tort litigation as a narrative of judicial ineffectiveness in resolving 
mass torts.182 Thus, after citing Rule 23 as authority for his power to adjust 
attorney fees, he attacked Rule 23 jurisprudence as an obstacle to 
accomplishing resolution of mass litigation. Judge Weinstein would have it 
both ways: he cited to Rule 23 both in support of his judicial powers183 and 
as an impediment to those powers. 
In particular, Judge Weinstein criticized the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Amchem and Ortiz, and the Second Circuit’s decisions in 
Stephenson v. Dow Chemical Co.,184 as decisions that “made total closure 
of possible future claims by class action more difficult.”185 Considering 
these obstructionist Supreme Court and Second Circuit decisions, Judge 
Weinstein discerned a trend and support for his new quasi-class action 
concept: 
 As a result of the dubious benefits available from class actions in resolving 
mass disputes, particularly in pharmaceutical cases, more defendants have 
now begun to embrace a form of quasi-class action to aggregate and settle 
cases, using masters, matrices and other administrative techniques.186 
 
180 CAFA’s operative removal provision for the most part relies on state law to define litigation as 
a class action. See § 1332(d)(1)(B). 
181 See id. § 1332(d)(11)(A). 
182 See, e.g., In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 467 F. Supp. 2d 256, 269 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (“[I]t is 
well to reflect for a moment on the recent history of mass litigation generally.”); see also In re Zyprexa 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d 268, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (manifesting concern for the effect of 
constraints on judicial power to resolve mass torts on the fate of the pharmaceutical industry and public 
health). 
183 “Mississippi’s suit is in the nature of a structural class action. The extensive case law regarding 
the uses and limitations of aggregate evidence in Rule 23 class actions is applicable.” In re Zyprexa, 
671 F. Supp. 2d at 433 (characterizing an individual lawsuit by the State of Mississippi as a “structural 
class action,” even though not pursued formally under Rule 23, resulting in an expansion of the court’s 
ability to consider certain types of evidence). 
184 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001), aff’d in part by an equally divided Court, vacated in part, 539 U.S. 
111 (2003) (per curiam). 
185 In re Zyprexa, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 269 (citing also to AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW 
OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION: DISCUSSION DRAFT (2006) (for discussion purposes, not yet referred to 
the ALI for adoption)). 
186 Id. at 269‒70. 
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In a subsequent Zyprexa order—invoking the same theme that 
criticizes the Amchem, Ortiz, and Stephenson decisions—Judge Weinstein 
similarly suggested: 
This development [the Amchem, Ortiz, and Stephenson decisions] has led a 
number of judges and attorneys, particularly in pharmaceutical cases, to 
attempt mass settlements on consolidated and cooperative basis without the 
formalities of a class action. The substitute quasi-class action aggregate 
technique has advantages and is being closely studied.187 
Judge Weinstein’s observation concerning the practicing bar and the 
judiciary’s embrace of private settlements as a preferred means for 
resolving aggregate liabilities, however, certainly does not provide 
authoritative legal support for the quasi-class action.188 The resolution of 
the subsequent Vioxx litigation illustrates how judicial deployment of the 
quasi-class action has expanded, beyond mere judicial authority to adjust 
attorney fees, to adversely affect the rights of unrepresented or 
underrepresented persons with an interest in the litigation. Moreover, the 
Vioxx litigation has inspired the first wholesale attack against the quasi-
class action through an appeal to the United States Supreme Court.189 
Similar to the Zyprexa litigation, the Vioxx MDL court’s decision to 
cap the contingent fee arrangements caused a consortium of plaintiffs’ 
lawyers, the Vioxx Litigation Consortium (VCL), to challenge that 
decision.190 The VCL challenged the court’s authority to adjust legal fees 
“by arguing that classifying an MDL as a quasi-class action [was] 
inappropriate.”191 The VCL pointed out that the underlying actions in an 
MDL are individual in nature whereas a class action is a representative 
proceeding.192 For this reason, the VCL contended, fee capping is 
appropriate in a class action but not in an MDL proceeding.193 
 
187 In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 238 F.R.D. 539, 541 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (similarly citing AM. 
LAW INST., supra note 185). 
188 In addition, apart from Judge Weinstein, there is scant evidence that “a number” of judges have 
supervised private mass settlement deals outside the purview of the class action rule. See discussion of 
the Vioxx settlement, infra notes 190–198 and accompanying text. But see In re Guidant Corp. 
Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708, 2008 WL 682174, at *6 (D. Minn. 
Mar. 7, 2008) (asserting the court’s authority to supervise the attorney fee award in the private 
settlement of a medical device mass action and noting that “[b]efore this Court is a coordinated 
litigation of many individual yet related cases that effectively is, and proceeded as, a quasi-class 
action”). 
189 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Dier v. Merck & Co. (In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig.), No. 
10-666 (U.S. Nov. 17, 2000); Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, In re Vioxx, No. 10-
666 (U.S. Jan. 21, 2011). The Court denied the petition for certiorari on February 22, 2011. See In re 
Vioxx, 131 S. Ct. 1477 (2011). 
190 See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d 549, 551 (E.D. La. 2009). 
191 Id. at 558. 
192 See id. 
193 See id. 
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The court responded by indicating that it was true that “the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure expressly provide that district courts may require 
reasonable fees in class actions while the MDL statute lacks an analogous 
provision.”194 But, relying on both the Zyprexa and Guidant cases, the 
Louisiana court held that the Vioxx settlement could be considered and 
analyzed as a quasi-class action and that therefore the court had the power 
to evaluate contingent fee contracts for reasonableness.195 The court noted 
that the global settlement in the Vioxx litigation bore a significant 
resemblance to the Zyprexa global settlement.196 Comparing the two 
litigations, the court concluded that “[g]iven these similarities, and 
§ 1407’s mandate of just and efficient treatment, it is correct to consider 
[the] MDL as a quasi-class action.”197 Furthermore, in assessing the 
boundaries of its authority under the private settlement agreement, the court 
noted that the parties had given the court express authority to modify any 
provision under certain circumstances.198 
D. Fund Approaches to Aggregate Claims Resolution 
The fourth notable shift in aggregate dispute resolution in the past 
decade relates to the American embrace in the twenty-first century “fund” 
approaches to resolving mass claims. Civil law countries, such as Germany, 
and other mixed-law jurisdictions, such as Japan, have used fund 
approaches to resolving mass injury in the past.199 But the United States, 
with its robust individual tort system, has long ignored this means for 
resolving large-scale injuries. 
Fund approaches to resolving mass liabilities are chiefly extrajudicial, 
private means for resolving aggregate claims. The United States has now 
experienced two such massive fund efforts: the World Trade Center Victim 
Compensation Fund, created in the aftermath of the World Trade Center 
terrorist attacks in September 2001, and the Gulf Coast Claims Facility 
(GCCF), created in the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon oil platform 
explosion in April 2010 and the ensuing oil spill.200 Ken Feinberg’s 
involvement as the administrator of these funds, and his advocacy for this 
means of aggregate claims resolution, has inspired him to declare that class 
actions are dead. 
 
194 Id. (comparing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(C)(iii), (h) with 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006)). 
195 See id. at 558‒59. Taking a page from Judge Weinstein’s playbook, the Louisiana federal court 
located its authority to oversee attorney fee arrangements in the quasi-class action context in various 
provisions of Rule 23, basic equity, and the FJC’s Manual for Complex Litigation. 
196 See id. at 559. 
197 Id. 
198 See id. at 554. 
199 See Mullenix, supra note 19, at 908 (discussing other countries’ historical use of fund 
approaches to resolving mass tort liabilities). 
200 See generally id. at 827‒37 (detailing the history of the creation of these two funds). 
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The two American fund experiences share common and uncommon 
characteristics.201 The WTC Fund was created through congressional 
enactment; the Gulf Coast Claims Facility was created with a handshake 
deal between BP and President Obama. The WTC Fund was implemented 
through a federal notice-and-comment rulemaking; the Gulf Coast Claims 
Facility was not. Instead, the GCCF was set up largely under the 
supervision of its administrator, Ken Feinberg, who is the administrator for 
both funds.202 
Numerous scholars and commentators have written extensively about 
the use of fund approaches to resolving aggregate claims.203 While the 
WTC Fund experience initially inspired admiring enthusiasts for this 
extrajudicial approach to resolving mass tort claims, a more critical 
commentary subsequently ensued as scholars carefully examined the 
implementation and results of the WTC Fund.204 
In the American context, fund approaches to resolving massive 
liabilities derived from their American antecedent, the class action 
settlement. Indeed, Feinberg began his career as Judge Jack Weinstein’s 
special master in the Agent Orange class action fund. Thus, one can draw a 
linear progression from the 1984 Agent Orange settlement class experience 
to the WTC and GCCF funds in 2001 and 2010. 
Similar to the evolution of MDL procedures and contractual nonclass 
aggregative settlements, the twenty-first-century embrace of fund 
approaches represents an incremental shift away from judicial auspices to 
an entirely different type of claims resolution mechanism that is largely 
free from the constraints of judicial oversight and the class action rule. 
Indeed, fund resolutions of mass claims occur independently of the judicial 
arena. Although the advocates of fund approaches applaud these new 
approaches as fair, inexpensive, and expeditious, independent 
commentators have paid insufficient attention to the negative consequences 
for claimants of poorly designed and implemented fund approaches. 
Finally, it is hardly surprising that the primary advocates for nonclass 
remedies include Judge Weinstein205 and Ken Feinberg, who want to be 
able to resolve complex litigation liberated from the class action rule, class 
action jurisprudence, and the rule of law generally. And, similar to the 
 
201 See id. 
202 Ken Feinberg was appointed the special master of the WTC Fund pursuant to congressional 
authorization under the enabling legislation. Because there was no congressional authorization for the 
GCCF, Ken Feinberg was appointed its administrator in a deal between BP and the White House. See 
id. at 863‒67 (discussing the appointment and responsibilities of the administrators for the WTC and 
GCCF). 
203 See id. at 822–26 & n.20 (cataloguing sources of commentary on the WTC Fund). 
204 See id. (documenting the positive and critical commentary relating to the WTC Fund). 
205 As is well-known, the Second Circuit has reversed many of Judge Weinstein’s class action 
decisions expanding the law beyond existing class action jurisprudence. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Am. 
Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2008); In re Simon II Litig., 407 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2005). 
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embrace of contractual nonclass settlement mechanisms, the experience of 
the GCCF demonstrates that corporate misfeasors who find themselves 
enmeshed in massive liabilities have recognized the attractiveness of 
resolving these claims outside the judicial arena. As I have argued 
elsewhere, the advent of fund approaches in the United States ought to be 
greeted with some degree of caution and alarm.206 
III. THE END OF DEMOCRATIC PROCESS: THE DEATH OF  
CLASS ACTIONS (III) 
A. Aggregate Litigation Claims Resolution in a Nonclass Universe—
Documenting the Paradigm Shift 
Since the advent of the twenty-first century, there has been a marked 
paradigm shift in the landscape of complex, aggregate litigation. The 
evolutionary drift towards the resolution of aggregate claims, unmoored 
from the class action rule, ought to be viewed with increasing concern. But 
to date, these novel means for complex dispute resolution have largely 
evaded public attention. Of even greater concern, advocates for these novel 
means of complex dispute resolution have aggressively sought to 
institutionalize and codify these mechanisms through such august bodies as 
the American Law Institute and various scholarly forums. 
Although it is easy to document that class actions are alive and well 
and flourishing, there has been a parallel paradigm shift in how complex 
cases are now resolved in the judicial and extrajudicial arenas. For those 
actors for whom the class action presents frustrating barriers to resolving 
massive litigation on favorable terms, there has been a decided shift away 
from the class action towards the creative invention of class-avoidance 
mechanisms. In other words, the class action went from being too novel, 
too flexible, and too extreme, to being too rigid and not novel enough. 
As discussed below, the drift to MDL forums, contractual aggregate 
nonclass settlements, the quasi-class action, and fund approaches to 
aggregate claims ought to be viewed with alarm because in evading the 
requirements of the class action rule, these mechanisms shift power over 
claims resolution entirely into the hands of self-interested parties and 
largely evade judicial scrutiny and oversight. The carefully articulated due 
process protections embedded in decades of class action jurisprudence 
consequently have been jettisoned, to the detriment of the claimants these 
very requirements were intended to protect.207 
 
206 See Mullenix, supra note 19, at 825 (arguing that fund approaches ought to be the object of 
concern). 
207 And this is to say nothing of Professor Redish’s critique of these techniques’ inherently 
undemocratic processes. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
552 
As discussed above, MDL forums, once a little-utilized and disfavored 
judicial backwater for managing complex cases, have instead become a 
preferred staging ground for disposing of massive liabilities. In addition, 
compliant MDL forums have now become the staging ground for creation 
of contractual aggregate nonclass settlements, which successfully evade the 
strictures of the class action rule. 
As part of this paradigm shift, the judicial invocation of the quasi-class 
action has been appearing with increasing, uncriticized frequency.208 While 
it may be premature to characterize these sporadic references as a trend,209 
it is perhaps soon enough to call attention to the misuse of loose labels that 
carries significant consequences. 
Judicial invocation of the concept of the quasi-class action ought to 
inspire concern for three reasons. First, there is no such thing as a quasi-
class action. As I have written elsewhere, there is no constitutional, 
statutory, doctrinal, or other basis for the quasi-class action.210 The label 
“quasi-class action” is a convenient, lazy fabrication to justify the lawless 
administration of aggregate claims. 
Second, whatever historical antecedents or analogues may exist for the 
concept of a quasi-class action, the 1966 amendments to Rule 23, the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Amchem and Ortiz, and multiple class actions 
decisions lay to rest any notions of a quasi-class action. The entire point of 
the class action rule is not only to supply an aggregate mechanism for 
efficiently resolving multiple claims, but also to balance efficiency values 
with the due process protection of absent class members in representative 
litigation. The quasi-class action is the antithesis of due process. It is a 
jurisprudential oxymoron that its proponents deploy to justify the 
expeditious resolution of aggregate claims, and it fails to adequately protect 
the interests of claimants. 
Third, the quasi-class action (along with contractual aggregate 
nonclass settlements) ought to be repudiated as an unfortunate drift into 
further lawlessness in administering aggregate claims.211 Over the past 
thirty years, actors involved in resolving aggregate claims—especially 
 
208 A Westlaw search in the “allfeds” database of the term “quasi-class action,” in February 2011, 
located sixty-eight federal cases citing the term. 
209 But see Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing 
Multidistrict Litigations: Problems and a Proposal 7 (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Working Papers, Paper 
No. 174, 2009), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_lewp/174 (describing the “emerging doctrine that 
MDLs are ‘quasi-class actions’” and endorsing expanded judicial powers for MDL judges managing 
such quasi-class actions). Cf. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 760 F. Supp. 2d 640, 643 n.4 (E.D. La. 
2010) (rejecting the suggestion by Professors Silver and Miller that “the attorneys themselves should 
select the Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee with the attorney with the largest number of plaintiff cases 
having the laboring oar. But the experience of the MDL courts suggest otherwise.” (citation omitted)). 
210 See Mullenix, supra note 153, at 389. 
211 For a discussion of aggregate settlements, including nonclass aggregate settlements, see AM. 
LAW INST., supra note 136, §§ 3.01‒.18, at 187‒282. 
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aggregate tort claims—have embraced claims-resolution models that allow 
malefactors to control, manage, and settle their liabilities on highly 
preferential terms; permit plaintiffs’ attorneys to reap bountiful and often 
excessive fees; and enable judges (and their surrogates) to clear their 
dockets of large numbers of cases. 
The interests of powerful, well-funded, and self-interested actors thus 
have tacitly converged to support a de facto collusive model of aggregate 
claims resolution. In the past three decades, federal courts, including the 
Supreme Court, have rejected collusive backroom aggregate settlement 
deals that do not adequately protect the interests of class members. In 
response, and in order to be free of formal class action constraints, self-
interested actors on both sides of the docket have co-opted the federal 
multidistrict litigation procedure to provide a compliant arena for the 
private resolution of aggregate claims. The most extreme variant of private 
aggregate claims resolution, completely outside the scrutiny of judicial 
management and review, is exemplified by fund approaches to mass claims 
resolution—most recently the Gulf Coast Claims Facility.212 
In the judicial arena, there are good reasons why complex litigation 
lawyers now embrace MDL procedure, whereas they eschewed this 
mechanism in the past. Because the formal class action rule became an 
inconvenient impediment to resolving aggregate claims favorably to both 
plaintiff and defense interests, actors involved in mass litigation now 
promote MDL procedure, contractual aggregate nonclass settlements, and 
the quasi-class action concept as entirely useful, creative mechanisms to 
accomplish self-interested goals. 
It is not at all surprising that self-interested negotiators and some MDL 
judges have embraced the concepts of the contractual aggregate nonclass 
settlement and the quasi-class action as the most effective means to resolve 
massive liabilities. Thus, in the early twenty-first century, private actors 
have evolved the nearly perfect model for accomplishing self-dealing 
agreements by manipulating MDL procedure to accomplish ends the 
mechanism was never intended to perform. Hence, contractually resolving 
mass claims under MDL auspices and the penumbra of the quasi-class 
action effectively does an end run around the class action rule and liberates 
deal makers from having to adequately protect the interests of injured 
claimants. 
The deployment of MDL jurisdiction—with the quasi-class action 
fiction engrafted onto it—has stripped away protections afforded by class 
action requirements. Mass litigation actors now may settle complex cases 
largely unconstrained by law. What the class action bar could not achieve 
through decades of judicial decisions—such as elimination of the need for 
an adequate class representative—has effectively been achieved through 
 
212 See discussion infra Part III.C. 
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adroit manipulation of MDL procedure and the ministrations of selected 
judges and their special masters. 
Before the inspired fabrication of the contractual aggregate nonclass 
settlement mechanism and the quasi-class action, global agreements 
accomplished under MDL auspices had to be settled pursuant to formal 
class requirements and due process protections.213 By engrafting the 
contractual nonclass settlement and quasi-class action concept onto MDL 
procedure, self-interested actors have created a perfect means for 
negotiating back-room deals that carry an aura of judicial legitimacy, 
liberated from the constraints of the formal class action rule. 
In turn, MDL judges, in endorsing contractual settlements and 
embracing the concept of the quasi-class action, have greatly expanded the 
scope of their authority and have become complicit in allowing private 
parties to accomplish the very backdoor settlements that the Supreme Court 
and federal courts have disallowed for decades. The combined means, then, 
represents an ultimate, cynical expression of an aggregate claims resolution 
model that enables self-interested actors to resolve claims in the actors’ 
best interests rather than the interests of injured claimants. 
B. The End of Structural Assurances of Due Process 
Judge Weinstein’s creation and repeated endorsement of the concept 
of the quasi-class action as an adjunct to private, contractual nonclass 
settlements illustrates how the paradigm shift in complex dispute resolution 
reflects a telling reaction to the constraints of conventional class action 
litigation. Thus, Judge Weinstein’s extensive policy justifications, 
documented above, embody a repudiation of decades of carefully crafted 
judicial class action jurisprudence, including Supreme Court decisions. 
Yet Judge Weinstein’s repudiation of the Amchem, Ortiz, and 
Stephenson decisions (among other class-action-constraining decisions) 
manifests a tone-deaf dismissal of the fundamental importance of those 
cases.214 Judge Weinstein rejected the Court’s Amchem, Ortiz, and 
 
213 Mark Herrmann, To MDL or Not to MDL? A Defense Perspective, LITIGATION, Summer 1998, 
at 43, 47 (listing examples of class settlements under MDL auspices); cf. L. Elizabeth Chamblee, 
Unsettling Efficiency: When Non-Class Aggregation of Mass Torts Creates Second-Class Settlements, 
65 LA. L. REV. 157, 227‒28, 235‒37 (2004) (arguing that MDL judges should review post-aggregation 
settlements using mechanisms similar to Rule 23); Jeremy T. Grabill, Judicial Review of Private Mass 
Tort Settlements, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 123 (2012) (describing new regime of contractual nonclass 
settlements and lack of judicial review under Rule 23). 
214 It is hardly surprising that Judge Weinstein would eschew the Second Circuit’s Stephenson 
decision which, in essence, held that Judge Weinstein had failed to provide future claimants with 
adequate representation at the time of his approval of the Agent Orange settlement. See Stephenson v. 
Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 261 (2d Cir. 2001), aff’d in part by an equally divided Court, vacated in 
part, 539 U.S. 111 (2003) (per curiam) (affirming that future claimants were not bound by class 
settlement of future claims due to a lack of adequate representation at the time of the settlement, and 
that future claimants were permitted to pursue collateral attack against the settlement). 
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Stephenson decisions because he perceived those decisions as limiting the 
usefulness of the class action rule to resolve mass litigation. 
Collectively, these decisions, Judge Weinstein believed, bound his 
hands as a judge and frustrated his ability to achieve efficiency in resolving 
big cases. These federal appellate class action decisions—with their 
heightened class certification and settlement requirements—were ill 
conceived in Weinstein’s view because they imposed impediments to 
judicial efforts to resolve mass cases. In addition, these decisions were 
harmful to industry and, in the instance of pharmaceutical litigation, 
adverse to public health considerations.215 
In this same vein, Judge Weinstein drew further support for private 
settlements under the umbrella of the quasi-class action because he viewed 
the quasi-class action as an antidote to the perceived failure of past mass 
tort litigation: “Most would agree that a reprise of the asbestos litigation 
with an almost uncontrolled search by plaintiffs’ attorneys for new cases 
and new parties, ultimately exhausting the courts and bankrupting 
industries, ought not be encouraged.”216 
However, the fundamental purpose of the Court’s reasoning in 
Amchem, Ortiz, and Stephenson was to strengthen the due process 
protections of absent class members by requiring heightened scrutiny of the 
Rule 23 adequacy-of-representation requirement, especially in the 
settlement context. Judge Weinstein, then, would jettison the requirements 
of Rule 23 and the due process protections of absent class members in 
favor of efficiency rationales. 
Therefore, if Amchem, Ortiz, and Stephenson have set the due process 
bar too high, Judge Weinstein would approve circumventing these 
decisions by allowing litigants to privately cut deals without the necessity 
of satisfying formal Rule 23 requirements and their concomitant due 
process protections. If Rule 23 were a barrier to accomplishing aggregate 
settlements, Judge Weinstein would simply dispense with the rule, except 
when needed to buttress support for his ability to exercise some judicial 
authority in a limited sphere of operation.217 
 
215 In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d 268, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (“In addition, the 
viability of an effective pharmaceutical industry and public health considerations necessitate efficient 
and fair control by the courts of cases of this kind.”). 
216 In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 238 F.R.D. 539, 541 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
217 See, e.g., In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 2d 397, 433 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(characterizing an individual lawsuit by the State of Mississippi as a “structural class action” even 
though not pursued formally under Rule 23, allowing application of class action jurisprudence 
regarding aggregate evidence, and effectively expanding the quantum of evidence the court could 
consider). 
 In fairness to Judge Weinstein, he does at least concede, in one of his Zyprexa orders, that 
“[a]voiding formal Rule 23 class actions presents serious pitfalls.” In re Zyprexa, 238 F.R.D. at 541. 
Judge Weinstein notes: “One is the possibility that new cases, and attorneys, will be attracted to the 
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C. Aggregate Litigation Claims Resolution as a Matter of Private 
Arrangements: The Death of Democratic Dispute Resolution 
The tectonic shift towards use of combined MDL procedures and 
contractual settlements, along with the embrace of the quasi-class action, 
should be cause enough for concern. But newfound enthusiasm for fund 
approaches to resolving massive liabilities ought to be viewed with equal 
alarm. These fund mechanisms, which have roots vaguely lodged in the 
class action settlement, have evolved into private arrangements that self-
promote their efficiency, pragmatism, and fairness. 
However, fund approaches to resolving massive liabilities bear little in 
common with their class action antecedents, apart from the common 
nomenclature “fund.” Indeed, fund approaches are almost the antithesis of 
the class action settlement because the driving rationale is to free these 
private arrangements from the very constraints of the class action rule. 
Adopting Professor Redish’s paradigm, fund approaches are the antithesis 
of democratic dispute resolution. 
Hence, as I have argued elsewhere, the GCCF represents a fund too far 
in the evolution of group remedies.218 Moreover, apart from its superficial 
designation as a compensation fund, the GCCF bears little resemblance to 
the WTC Victim Compensation Fund, which arguably was the more 
commendable (though controversial) effort at a fund approach to resolving 
mass claims. Although these two fund mechanisms shared the same all-
powerful administrator, the two were entirely unlike one another. 
First, the WTC Victim Compensation Fund was widely acknowledged 
as a sui generis, one-time endeavor to compensate victims of a national 
terrorist disaster.219 Indeed, Special Master Feinberg repeatedly stressed 
 
honey pot of the litigation after all, or almost all, of the well-founded cases have been disposed of. Only 
the Rule 23 class action can provide full closure in many litigations.” Id. 
 However, after acknowledging that Rule 23 has its virtues, Judge Weinstein nonetheless defaulted 
to his preferred position, which favors private settlement of mass litigation under the auspices of MDL 
proceedings. Again, in one of his earliest decisions discussing the quasi-class action, Judge Weinstein 
acknowledged that many of the concerns about the protection of class members should apply with equal 
force to aggregate settlements achieved in a nonclass format. Thus, Judge Weinstein wrote: 
 Many of the same considerations that necessitate close judicial supervision of plaintiffs’ 
counsel and proposed settlements in the class action context―such as protecting absent or 
disinterested litigants, and dealing with plaintiffs’ practical inability to monitor their attorneys, 
some of whom represent hundreds of clients within the same litigation―apply to quasi-class 
actions such as the instant one. Some of the conventions required when a class is certified are 
appropriate in quasi-class actions involving large aggregations of claims. In both contexts, the 
primary goal of the court is to “ensure that similarly situated individuals receive equal fairness 
protections regardless of how the courts aggregated the litigation.” 
In re Zyprexa, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 272 (quoting Chamblee, supra note 213). However, Judge 
Weinstein’s initial recognition of the need for Rule 23 constraints in the context of quasi-class action 
settlements does not reappear in his numerous subsequent citations to the quasi-class action “rule.” 
218 Mullenix, supra note 19, at 825–26, 913–16. 
219 See, e.g., 1 KENNETH R. FEINBERG ET AL., DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL 
MASTER FOR THE SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001, at 83–84 (2004), available 
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that the Victim Compensation Fund was neither a model for tort reform nor 
a model for any future terrorist or other disaster.220 Feinberg consistently 
insisted that the WTC Fund was not a model for anything.221 And many, if 
not most, academic commentators agreed with that assessment.222 Yet 
Feinberg nonetheless touted the WTC Victim Compensation Fund223 as the 
 
at http://www.usdoj.gov/final_report.pdf; Robert M. Ackerman, The September 11th Victim 
Compensation Fund: An Effective Administrative Response to National Tragedy, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. 
REV. 135, 205 (2005) (“Because the Fund is sui generis, it is unlikely to have a profound impact on 
developments in the law of torts.” (footnote omitted)); Martha Chamallas, The September 11th Victim 
Compensation Fund: Rethinking the Damages Element in Injury Law, 71 TENN. L. REV. 51, 53 (2003) 
(“Perhaps the most repeated observation made about the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 
like the horrible events which brought it into being, is that it is unique and has no close parallel in the 
history of United States injury and compensation law.”); Robert S. Peck, The Victim Compensation 
Fund: Born from a Unique Confluence of Events Not Likely to Be Duplicated, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 209 
(2003) (comparing the World Trade Center events to the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941); 
Robert L. Rabin, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund: A Circumscribed Response or an 
Auspicious Model?, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 769, 771 (2003); Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman, 
The Case for Specially Compensating the Victims of Terrorist Acts: An Assessment, 35 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 901, 907 (2007) (“[The] 9/11 [attack] was the quintessential once-in-a-lifetime disaster.”); Erin G. 
Holt, Note, The September 11 Victim Compensation Fund: Legislative Justice Sui Generis, 59 N.Y.U. 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 513, 535, 539–40 (2004). But see Michele Landis Dauber, The War of 1812, 
September 11th, and the Politics of Compensation, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 289 (2003) (arguing that the 
WTC Victim Compensation Fund was not unprecedented and that the federal government historically 
has been involved in compensating victims of various types of calamities, including other victims of 
terror). 
220 1 FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 219, at 83; KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH? 178 
(2005) (“[I]t would be a mistake for Congress or the public to take the 9/11 fund as . . . a model in the 
event of future attacks.”); Kenneth Feinberg, The Building Blocks of Successful Victim Compensation 
Programs, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 273, 276–77 (2005); Kenneth R. Feinberg, Negotiating the 
September 11 Victim Compensation Fund of 2001: Mass Tort Resolution Without Litigation, Address 
Before the Washington University School of Law (Sept. 14, 2004), in 19 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 21, 29 
(2005) (“9/11 was unique and gave rise to a unique response. That is the only way, I think, to explain 
it.”); Q & A with Kenneth Feinberg, C-SPAN VIDEO LIBRARY (July 1, 2005), http://www.c-spanvideo.
org/program/187524-1 (stating that the 9/11 Fund was an aberration and unique); see also Peter T. 
Elikann, Book Review, 90 MASS. L. REV. 48, 50‒51 (2006) (noting that Feinberg does not believe the 
WTC Victim Fund should be a model for tort reform); Robert L. Rabin, September 11th Through the 
Prism of Victim Compensation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 464, 479 (2006) (book review) (noting the same); 
James E. Rooks, Jr., Book Review, TRIAL, Mar. 2006, at 74, 75 (noting the same). 
221 1 FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 219; FEINBERG, supra note 220; see also Rabin, supra note 220, 
(contending that the thrust of Feinberg’s argument, that the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund 
would be a mistake as a precedent for future programs, is puzzling). 
222 See, e.g., Rabin & Sugarman, supra note 219, at 913 (“[A]n ad hoc fund by its very nature runs 
a substantial risk of being myopic in design―fixated with excessive particularity on the event at hand. 
In this regard, the 9/11 Fund provides a cautionary note.”); see also Robert L. Rabin, The Quest for 
Fairness in Compensating Victims of September 11, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 573, 588 (2001); Larry S. 
Stewart et al., The September 11th Compensation Fund: Past or Prologue?, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 153, 171 
(2002) (stating that the fund will “not likely serve as a model for future ‘reform’ of the American civil 
justice system”). 
223 See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, §§ 401‒409, 
115 Stat. 230, 237‒41 (2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2006)). 
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model for the GCCF.224 It should give some pause that the special master 
who repeatedly disavowed his own work then relied on it in a different and 
anomalous context. 
Second, almost every aspect of the GCCF was unlike the WTC Victim 
Compensation Fund. Among numerous features, the funds differed in the 
nature of the events giving rise to creation of the fund, authorization, 
rulemaking, review mechanisms, transparency, election of remedies, 
applicable law, assistance of counsel, and litigation alternatives, as well as 
the role of the prospective defendants.225 In addition, the GCCF raised 
challenging ethical and professional responsibility issues as well as 
questions relating to the fund’s transparency. 
Third, the GCCF represented an unnoticed, incremental trend towards 
the lawless, private resolution of mass claims, which resolution was created 
by a culpable defendant, unbounded by legal norms, and administered by a 
heroic special master with limitless, unreviewable discretion who also was 
in the employ of the malefactor. Whatever else may be argued on behalf of 
the GCCF, this cannot be a good development. 
Feinberg’s initial experience with the use of a fund to resolve mass 
claims involved his participation as a special master in the Agent Orange 
litigation in the late 1970s and early 1980s.226 Feinberg himself frequently 
refers to this formative experience as the basis for techniques he engrafted 
onto his management of the WTC and GCCF funds, such as the use of 
town hall meetings to address the victims’ concerns and to make the claims 
process more personal for its participants.227 
The Agent Orange fund model, however, was jurisprudentially light-
years removed from the GCCF. First, the Agent Orange fund was created 
to implement a negotiated class action settlement.228 Second, the Agent 
Orange litigation began with hundreds of lawsuits filed in state and federal 
courts.229 Finally, many years of contested litigation preceded the 
adversaries’ ultimate agreement to settle a class action and create the Agent 
Orange fund.230 
 
224 See, e.g., Meet the Press Interview with Ken Feinberg, Independent Administrator of the BP Oil 
Spill Victim Compensation Fund, NBCNEWS.COM (June 20, 2010) available at http://video.msnbc.msn.
com/meet-the-press-netcast/37809679#37809679 (in which Feinberg describes, beginning soon after 
minute 19, how he drew on the lessons of the WTC Fund to guide his implementation of the GCCF). 
225 See Mullenix, supra note 19, at 821, 823. 
226 See SCHUCK, supra note 30, at 144–45. 
227 See Full Committee Hearing on Recovery in the Gulf: What the $20 Billion BP Claims Fund 
Means for Small Businesses: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Small Business, 111th Cong. 7 (2010) 
(statement of Kenneth Feinberg, Administrator, Gulf Coast Claims Facility) [hereinafter Feinberg 
Statement]. 
228 See SCHUCK, supra note 30, at 143–67. 
229 See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 1987). 
230 See id. at 157‒58. 
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The Agent Orange litigation and settlement was managed under the 
close supervision of Judge Weinstein,231 and the Agent Orange fund was a 
creature of a Rule 23 class action settlement.232 Whatever role Feinberg 
may have played in the resolution of the Agent Orange litigation, he was 
appointed as a special master in that litigation under the authority of Rule 
53.233 Feinberg’s authority and powers in the Agent Orange fund were 
limited and circumscribed by law, and he was answerable to the federal 
court.234 
It is important to emphasize that the Agent Orange fund was the 
creature of a class action settlement.235 As such, before this fund 
mechanism could begin to provide compensation to veterans, Judge 
Weinstein had to review and approve the Agent Orange settlement pursuant 
to Rule 23(e).236 The Agent Orange fund, then, was subject to an array of 
substantive and procedural due process constraints, not the least of which 
was the requirement that Weinstein find that class claimants had been 
accorded adequate representation. 
Hence, the Agent Orange fund was created subject to an array of legal 
constraints, and Feinberg, in his role as special master, did not function as a 
free-wheeling, unbounded law giver. Moreover, in the largely uncritical 
commentary lauding the Agent Orange fund,237 it is frequently overlooked 
that litigants successfully challenged the Agent Orange settlement nearly 
twenty-five years after Weinstein’s approval of the fund on due process 
grounds for the failure to provide future claimants with adequate 
representation.238 
Feinberg’s second experience with a fund approach to resolving mass 
claims was his administration of the WTC Fund. The WTC Fund 
represented an innovative approach to resolving mass tort claims against 
the backdrop of national tragedy. In terms of both substance and procedure, 
the WTC Fund drew loosely from its class action cousin. But the WTC 
Fund was not the result of class litigation or the close judicial supervision 
entailed in settling class litigation. 
Thus, the WTC Fund represented a fund archetype once removed from 
the class action model, although not without legal constraints. The Fund 
 
231 Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange Example, 
53 U. CHI. L. REV. 337, 341‒43 (1986). 
232 See In re Agent Orange, 818 F.2d at 155‒58, 174 (upholding a class action settlement). 
233 See SCHUCK, supra note 30, at 144–45. 
234 See id. 
235 See In re Agent Orange, 818 F.2d at 155‒58, 174 (upholding a class action settlement). 
236 In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 758 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). 
237 See, e.g., Martha Minow, Judge for the Situation: Judge Jack Weinstein, Creator of Temporary 
Administrative Agencies, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2010, 2011 (1997). 
238 See Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 261 (2d Cir. 2001), aff’d in part by an 
equally divided Court, vacated in part, 539 U.S. 111 (2003) (per curiam). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
560 
was a creature of federal statute subject to congressional oversight with a 
special master appointed by the Executive Branch who was accountable to 
Congress and the Department of Justice.239 In addition, the WTC Fund 
incorporated several features of the rule of law, including public notice-
and-comment rulemaking and significant transparency.240 
Although legal authorization undergirded the WTC Fund, it signaled 
an expansive progression from the class action model. The WTC Fund was 
not created within the scope of federal judicial authority, nor was it 
subjected to judicial oversight and management. Unlike in the class action 
context, decisions relating to the WTC Fund were not subject to judicial 
review for substantive or procedural due process. Moreover, the WTC 
special master had liberal rulemaking and other authority,241 which he 
increasingly exercised in an ad hoc fashion, and his award determinations 
were subjected to limited appellate review. 
The GCCF illustrated a third and seemingly lawless expansion of the 
fund approach to resolving mass claims. It was difficult to discern the legal 
authorization for the fund, other than vague references to the Oil Pollution 
Act.242 The GCCF was not created to implement a class action settlement, 
nor did Congress authorize creation of this fund. Thus, the GCCF was not 
subjected to the scrutiny that would have accompanied a class action 
settlement or congressional oversight. 
Moreover, it is difficult to characterize exactly what the GCCF was 
and what legal status this entity had, if any. Feinberg described the GCCF 
as a “compact;”243 federal Judge Barbier described the GCCF as a 
“hybrid.”244 The GCCF was largely a private claims-adjusting facility 
acting in ad hoc fashion and run by a culpable party’s retained autocrat. It 
did not function as a mediation or arbitration center, and claims 
administrators were not designated or selected through adversarial 
processes. The GCCF thus functioned outside judicial scrutiny and was 
seemingly not subject to any professional rules of conduct. 
 
239 See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, §§ 401–409, 
115 Stat. 230, 237–41 (2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2006)). 
240 Id. § 404(a)(2); see also 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006) (notice-and-comment procedures under the 
federal Administrative Procedure Act); September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 66 Fed. 
Reg. 55,901 (proposed Nov. 5, 2001). The Interim Final Rule was published on December 21, 2001. 
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,274 (Dec. 21, 2001). The Final 
Rule was published on March 13, 2002. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. 
Reg. 11,233 (Mar. 13, 2002) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 104). But see Mullenix, supra note 19, at 838‒39 
(describing how, despite the formal notice-and-comment requirements, the regulations promulgated 
thereunder were more flexible than one might have assumed). 
241 See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 405(b)(4)(C). 
242 Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701‒2762 (2006). 
243 Feinberg Statement, supra note 227, at 4. 
244 In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on April 20, 2010, 
MDL No. 2179, 2011 WL 323866, at *5 (E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2011) (granting plaintiffs’ motion to 
supervise ex parte communications with the putative class). 
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Instead, the GCCF was the result of private, behind-closed-door 
negotiations with unidentified participants.245 The fund was created and 
funded by the primary malefactor who picked the fund’s administrator.246 
The relationship between BP and its administrator raised numerous 
significant ethical issues, centrally relating to the administrator’s 
independence.247 The administrator and his law firm financially profited 
from administration of the fund.248 There were numerous indicia that BP 
did not operate independent of the fund but rather intervened in crucial 
decisions relating to the fund’s implementation, which decisions favored 
BP’s interests.249 
The GCCF engaged in no public rulemaking and virtually all its 
decisions were cloaked in secrecy, including its criteria and personnel.250 
The fund operated largely in a nontransparent fashion, with limited avenues 
for independent appellate review.251 There was a significant lack of 
information upon which Gulf Coast victims might determine the possible 
valuation of their claims and whether it made sense to seek remediation 
through the GCCF.252 In spite of promises to provide legal assistance to 
Gulf Coast claimants, such provision of counsel was virtually nonexistent 
or slow in being provided.253 Claims administration was protracted and 
 
245 See Mullenix, supra note 19, at 833‒34 (discussing the legally uncertain genesis of the fund and 
noting that “[t]he OPA does not, by its terms, require creation of a claims facility or a fund or any other 
mechanism for victim compensation”). 
246 See In re Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon, MDL No. 2179, 2011 WL 323866 at *1, *5; Mullenix, 
supra note 19, at 865‒66. 
247 See In re Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon, MDL No. 2179, 2011 WL 323866 at *1 (“[T]he nature of 
the relationship between BP and the GCCF and Mr. Feinberg remains a disputed issue.”). 
248 See id. at *5 (noting that Feinberg and his law firm received a monthly fee from BP). 
249 See Ian Urbina, BP Settlements Likely to Shield Top Defendants, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2010, at 
A1 (describing BP influence on the scope of the waiver and release that required GCCF fund claimants 
to waive their right to sue not only BP but also all other major defendants involved with the spill). 
250 Feinberg, as claims administrator, made little effort to publicize proposed protocols in advance 
of their implementation. See id. (describing the proposed protocol for emergency payments as per 
internal documents from lawyers at the fund, which provided the “first definitive picture” of how claims 
would be paid and to whom). 
251 Feinberg himself would not have disagreed with this characterization, as in his words, “I think 
one task I have got to do quickly is develop a much more transparent sunlight so that Congress, as part 
of its oversight function[, can monitor the claims process].” Feinberg Statement, supra note 227, at 6; 
see also Mullenix, supra note 19, at 878‒81 (discussing the limited reviewability of GCCF 
administrator decisions). 
252 Even members of Congress, let alone small business owners in the Gulf states, were unsure 
about the process and how much they could take from the fund before waiving their right to sue. 
Feinberg Statement, supra note 227, at 12‒13; see also Mullenix, supra note 19, at 854‒59 (describing 
transparency and consistency problems in claims valuation under the GCCF). 
253 See Mullenix, supra note 19 at 899‒901; see also Dionne Searcey, BP Oil-Spill Claims Get Fast 
Track, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487040587045
76015591156318386.html (Feinberg to announce that “anyone who wants a lawyer to help them sort 
through new options can have one for free” and that “Feinberg plans to hire a firm to offer . . . free legal 
services”). 
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multiple claims were delayed or denied. Claimants complained about 
inconsistent awards. The waiver required as a condition for the final 
settlement released a large array of potential claims, including dozens of 
potential defendants in addition to BP. Against this chaotic background, the 
GCCF’s administrator repeatedly urged Gulf Coast residents and 
businesses to seek compensation in the GCCF as the best means for 
receiving compensation, for which the federal court in Louisiana finally 
enjoined him.254 
Hence, almost every hallmark supporting the legitimacy of an 
alternative dispute resolution facility, including important due process 
protections for claimants, was lacking in implementation of the GCCF.255 
Not all fund approaches to resolving mass claims are the same, and not 
all funds are fungible. Nonetheless, funds are now invoked with almost 
talismanic approval as a preferred means for providing compensation to 
disaster victims outside the litigation system.256 Moreover, the GCCF 
provides a stellar example of the unseemly pressure exerted on disaster 
victims to quickly seek relief through a fund mechanism rather than 
retaining counsel and filing a lawsuit. 
The greatest justifications for fund resolution of mass claims are 
grounded in values of efficiency and economy.257 The theory underlying 
fund resolution of claims is that by avoiding the litigation system, 
claimants receive quick, easy payment of claims and eliminate the risks, 
transaction costs, and delays inherent in litigation. With the advent of the 
GCCF, however, commentators ought to ask probing questions concerning 
who benefits from these mechanisms and whether the GCCF model in 
particular serves the interests of justice, and for whom.258 
 
254 See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 
2010, MDL No. 2179, 2011 WL 323866 (E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2011). 
255 Ironically, Feinberg himself has stated that an excellent alternative dispute resolution facility 
must satisfy three design variables: substantive criteria, due process protections, and mechanics. See 
Feinberg, supra note 220, at 275. 
256 One critic perceives the trend towards fund solutions to mass tort claims as eroding fundamental 
justice: “Yet, tort law will continue to be eroded by attrition, by lopping off remedies―especially by 
limiting damages and expanding immunities―unless we are able to grab hold of the public’s 
conscience and consciousness to bring home the point that liability in tort is not some form of 
punishment, erratically inflicted.” George W. Conk, Will the Post 9/11 World Be a Post-Tort World?, 
112 PENN. ST. L. REV. 175, 177 (2007). 
257 See Ackerman, supra note 219, at 220 (“Efficiency was a major reason for the Fund, and 
because of both the manner in which it was tailored and the laudable, professional efforts of the Special 
Master and his staff, the efficiency goal was met.”). 
258 See generally Janet Cooper Alexander, Procedural Design and Terror Victim Compensation, 
53 DEPAUL L. REV. 627 (2003) (enumerating factors to consider in the future design of compensation 
funds for victims of disaster and terrorist attacks). 
107:511 (2013) The Death of Democratic Dispute Resolution 
563 
CONCLUSION: IS THE ARC OF HISTORY BENDING TOWARDS  
GREATER INJUSTICE? 
This Article began with reflections on Professor Redish’s important 
contribution to elevating the debate over class action litigation, culminating 
in his influential book Wholesale Justice. However, Redish’s critique is 
anchored in the great class action debates of the 1990s. By the time of its 
publication, a significant paradigm shift had occurred in complex dispute 
resolution away from employing class action auspices to resolve complex 
litigation. And while class action litigation is not dead, new forms of 
nonclass aggregate dispute resolution now dominate the landscape. 
If the litigation paradigm has shifted to nonclass resolution of 
aggregate claims, then what is the continued value and relevance of 
Professor Redish’s appraisal of class litigation? The answer simply is that 
Redish’s democratic critique now has even greater resonance for the new 
nonclass means of aggregate dispute resolution. The same concerns over 
lack of participation, due process, voluntariness, and consent that animated 
Redish’s criticisms of the class action mechanism have even greater import 
for the new forms of nonclass aggregate dispute resolution. 
As I have noted elsewhere,259 the arc of Ken Feinberg’s career neatly 
demonstrates the evolution of different models of aggregate dispute 
resolution, progressing from arguably the most legitimate to arguably the 
least legitimate (and most lawless).260 However, scant attention has focused 
on how these aggregate dispute resolution mechanisms have evolved from 
older procedural means governed by the rule of law to various new models 
essentially unconstrained by law. 
The parties involved in these new models for aggregate dispute 
resolution—the contractual settlement, the quasi-class action, and fund 
approaches—praise these mechanisms for their efficiency in claims 
resolution. However, one may legitimately question whether pragmatism 
and efficiency ought to be the bellwether metrics or the animating values 
for a successful compensation program. 
In contrast, other commentators have suggested (similar to Professor 
Redish’s critique of the class action rule) that compensation programs 
ought to be evaluated by the core substantive values of democratic 
governance, which include the values of participation, accountability, 
transparency, rationality, personal autonomy, consent, equality, due 
process, and other social capital values necessary to promote civil 
society.261 
 
259 Mullenix, supra note 19, at 825, 909–13. 
260 Id. at 909‒10. In Feinberg’s case, this represents a seamless progression from (1) a judicially 
approved and managed class action settlement to (2) a congressionally mandated and supervised fund to 
(3) a defendant-created and directed fund. 
261 See Ackerman, supra note 219, at 202–06 (quoting George L. Priest, The Problematic Structure 
of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 527, 545 (2003) (“The 
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Scholars thus have suggested that elements of procedural justice 
include: (1) whether procedures allow people an opportunity to state their 
case; (2) whether authorities are viewed as neutral, unbiased, honest, and 
principled in their decisionmaking; (3) whether the authorities are seen as 
benevolent, caring, and trustworthy; and (4) whether the people involved 
are treated with dignity and respect.262 Undoubtedly, Professor Redish 
would add other core values identified in Wholesale Justice. 
The twenty-first-century paradigm shift to the concept of aggregate 
litigation and nonclass solutions to mass claims ought to be a cause for 
concern. If Professor Redish’s life’s work embodies a significant critical 
evaluation of the undemocratic nature of class litigation, then the argument 
may be made that the new models of nonclass aggregate dispute resolution 
represent an even more compelling illustration of the death of democratic 
dispute resolution. Against this backdrop, the appropriate focus ought to be 
justice for claimants and what democratic theory requires to this end. 
 
September 11th Fund will remain controversial because the source of the definition of its 
awards―however able and committed―is not in any sense democratic. Coupled with the lack of an 
internal rational[e] or constraint, the awards granted by the Fund will continue to remain problematic.”); 
Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem of Arbitration, 67 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 279, 285–86 (2004)). Other commentators have suggested that the WTC Fund 
signaled the beginning of a “broad regressive trend.” See Conk, supra note 256, at 253. 
262 Tom R. Tyler & Hulda Thorisdottir, A Psychological Perspective on Compensation for Harm: 
Examining the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 355, 384 (2003) 
(noting that the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund failed to create either distributive justice or 
procedural fairness amongst recipients of the Fund, and concluding that “none of the aforementioned 
ways of creating perceptions of procedural fairness were utilized when the Fund was initially 
established”). 
